Merge docs-maintenance: Phase 6 complete, project in holding pattern

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update Workplan current status: phases 6.5/7/9 all externally gated
2026-04-27 13:18:01 +02:00 · 2026-04-27 13:17:58 +02:00 · 2026-04-27 11:29:26 +02:00 · 2026-04-27 11:27:57 +02:00 · 2026-04-27 10:44:43 +02:00 · 2026-04-26 07:14:19 +02:00
17 changed files with 5396 additions and 16 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
 .codex/
 __pycache__/
 *.pyc
+tls/
+node_modules/
+playwright-report/
+test-results/

 # Keep firmware SDK tree out of this workspace-tracking repo
 CR_SDK_CK-main/
--- a/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md
+++ b/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md
@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+# Phase 5 Runbook (Session Reuse Prototype)
+
+This runbook starts a minimal `k_server` + `k_proxy` prototype for session reuse testing.
+
+Last updated: 2026-04-26
+
+Related browser demo:
+
+- `k_client_portal.py` can now be used in `k_client` at `http://127.0.0.1:8766` to show:
+  - registration
+  - current registered-user list from `k_proxy`
+  - unregister from the browser page
+  - login with card approval/denial
+  - protected `k_server` counter access
+  - logout
+  - explicit "k_server was not called" behavior when login is denied
+
+## What This Prototype Covers
+
+- `k_proxy` creates short-lived sessions.
+- Session creation uses a card-presence check (`fido2_probe.py --json`) as the current auth gate.
+- Valid sessions can repeatedly access a protected `k_server` counter endpoint without re-running card auth each request.
+- Session status and logout/invalidation paths are implemented.
+
+## Modes
+
+There are two useful ways to run this prototype:
+
+- Same-VM quickstart: `k_proxy` and `k_server` run on one VM for app-local testing.
+- Split-VM chain: `k_proxy` runs in `k_proxy`, `k_server` runs in `k_server`, and the Qubes forwarding layer must permit the chain.
+
+## Start Services
+
+### Same-VM quickstart
+
+This matches the code defaults and is useful for basic app behavior only.
+
+In the chosen VM:
+
+```bash
+python3 /home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8780 --proxy-token dev-proxy-token
+```
+
+In the same VM:
+
+```bash
+python3 /home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py \
+  --host 127.0.0.1 \
+  --port 8770 \
+  --session-ttl 300 \
+  --server-base-url http://127.0.0.1:8780 \
+  --proxy-token dev-proxy-token
+```
+
+### Split-VM chain
+
+This is the current Qubes target shape.
+
+In `k_server` VM:
+
+```bash
+python3 /home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py \
+  --host 127.0.0.1 \
+  --port 8780 \
+  --proxy-token dev-proxy-token \
+  --tls-certfile /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_server.crt \
+  --tls-keyfile /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_server.key
+```
+
+In `k_proxy` VM:
+
+```bash
+qvm-connect-tcp 9780:k_server:8780
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+```bash
+python3 /home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py \
+  --host 127.0.0.1 \
+  --port 8771 \
+  --session-ttl 300 \
+  --server-base-url https://127.0.0.1:9780 \
+  --server-ca-file /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt \
+  --proxy-token dev-proxy-token \
+  --tls-certfile /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_proxy.crt \
+  --tls-keyfile /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_proxy.key
+```
+
+In `k_client` VM:
+
+```bash
+qvm-connect-tcp 9771:k_proxy:8771
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- Current validated split-VM path is `k_client localhost:9771 -> k_proxy localhost:8771 -> k_proxy localhost:9780 forward -> k_server localhost:8780`.
+- Use `--cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt` for TLS verification in `curl`-based checks.
+- Raw VM-IP routing is not the validated path for the current prototype.
+
+## Ownership And Concurrency
+
+- `k_proxy` is authoritative for session state.
+- `k_server` is authoritative for the protected counter state.
+- Sessions are in-memory only in `k_proxy` and are lost on proxy restart.
+- The protected counter is in-memory only in `k_server` and resets on server restart.
+- Both services use `ThreadingHTTPServer`.
+- `k_proxy` guards its session store with a single process-local lock.
+- `k_server` guards counter increments with a single process-local lock.
+- Qubes localhost forwarders are transport plumbing only; they are not a source of state authority.
+
+## Test Flow
+
+Use the proxy port that matches the mode you started:
+
+- Same-VM quickstart: `8770`
+- Split-VM chain: `9771` from `k_client`, `8771` inside `k_proxy`
+
+Create a session (runs auth gate once):
+
+```bash
+curl -sS --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/session/login \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"username":"alice"}'
+```
+
+Copy `session_token` from response, then:
+
+```bash
+TOKEN='<paste-token>'
+```
+
+Check session:
+
+```bash
+curl -sS --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/session/status \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+```
+
+Call protected resource multiple times (should not require new login):
+
+```bash
+curl -sS --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/resource/counter \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+curl -sS --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/resource/counter \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+```
+
+Logout/invalidate:
+
+```bash
+curl -sS --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/session/logout \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+```
+
+Re-check after logout (should fail with 401):
+
+```bash
+curl -i --cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt -X POST https://127.0.0.1:<proxy-port>/resource/counter \
+  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+```
+
+## Regression Script
+
+For the split-VM chain, use the host-side regression helper:
+
+```bash
+/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh
+```
+
+Defaults:
+
+- Drives the test from `k_client` over SSH.
+- Uses `https://127.0.0.1:9771` and `/home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt` inside `k_client`.
+- Logs in as `alice`.
+- Runs `20` counter requests at parallelism `8`.
+- Verifies that returned counter values are unique and gap-free, then logs out and checks for `401` after logout.
+
+Useful overrides:
+
+```bash
+REQUESTS=50 PARALLELISM=12 /home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh
+```
+
+```bash
+/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh --username alice --client-host k_client
+```
+
+For the browser-facing `k_client` page, use the Playwright regression spec:
+
+```bash
+npm install
+npx playwright install
+npm run test:k-client
+```
+
+Notes:
+
+- default target is `http://127.0.0.1:8766`
+- override with `PORTAL_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8766`
+- the spec expects manual card confirmation during register and login
+- timeouts can be tuned with `CARD_REGISTRATION_TIMEOUT_MS` and `CARD_LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS`
+- from this host, a forwarded portal URL was used successfully:
+  - `PORTAL_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18766 npm run test:k-client`
+
+Verified result on 2026-04-25:
+
+- Live split-VM chain passed end-to-end.
+- Login, session status, counter reuse, and logout all worked from `k_client`.
+- A `20` request / `8` worker concurrency burst returned unique, gap-free counter values `23..42`.
+- The Playwright browser regression for `k_client_portal.py` also passed end-to-end:
+  - register
+  - login
+  - protected counter
+  - logout
+  - unregister
+
+## Current Limitation
+
+- The stable deployed baseline still uses card-presence probing, not full assertion verification, for the default auth gate.
+- Session and counter state are still process-local only; restart loses state.
+- Upstream trust still relies on a shared static `X-Proxy-Token`.
+- Experimental direct FIDO2 mode exists in `k_proxy_app.py` behind `--auth-mode fido2-direct`:
+  - direct `/enroll/register` now succeeds
+  - direct `/session/login` now succeeds and returns `auth_mode: "fido2_assertion"`
+  - direct `/session/status`, `/resource/counter`, and `/session/logout` also succeed end-to-end
+  - the mode remains optional for now; the deployed service was returned to default `probe` mode so the validated Phase 5 baseline stays reproducible
+- Raw CTAP debugging helper exists at `/home/user/chromecard/raw_ctap_probe.py`:
+  - use it on `k_proxy` to exercise low-level `makeCredential` / `getAssertion`
+  - it logs keepalive callbacks and transport exceptions
+- `phase5_chain_regression.sh` now supports card-interactive direct auth via:
+  - `--interactive-card`
+  - `--expect-auth-mode fido2_assertion`
+
+## Current Focus
+
+- Keep the HTTPS split-VM chain reproducible in default `probe` mode.
+- Decide whether `fido2-direct` is ready to become the default deployed auth path.
+- Continue Phase 6.5 concurrency work; the active system limit is still higher-fan-out Qubes forwarding on the browser-facing path rather than basic Phase 5 functionality.
--- a/Setup.md
+++ b/Setup.md
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Setup

-Last updated: 2026-04-24
+Last updated: 2026-04-27

 This is a living setup/status file for the local ChromeCard workspace at `/home/user/chromecard`.
 Update this file whenever environment status or verified behavior changes.
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Update this file whenever environment status or verified behavior changes.

 ## Target Qubes Topology

- Base template for all AppVMs: Debian template.
+- Base template for all AppVMs: `debian-13-xfce`.
 - Allowed network paths:
  - `k_client` -> `k_proxy` over TLS
  - `k_proxy` -> `k_server` over TLS
@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ Functional roles:
  - Provides a dummy protected resource for early integration testing (monotonic increasing number/counter).
  - May hold user/session state logic needed for authorization decisions.

+UI baseline for each AppVM (start-menu visible apps):
+- Firefox
+- XFCE Terminal
+- File Manager
+
 ## Target Request Flow

 1. `k_client` sends HTTPS request to `k_proxy`.
@ -110,21 +115,538 @@ Thread-safety expectation:

 ## Current Status Snapshot (2026-04-24)

- Python is available: `Python 3.13.12`.
- `python3 fido2_probe.py --list` runs, but returns: `No CTAP HID devices found.`
- No HID raw device nodes currently visible: `no hidraw devices visible`.
+- AppVM OS version is confirmed: Debian `13.4` (`k_server`, and same on `k_client`/`k_proxy`).
+- Python in AppVMs is available: `Python 3.13.5`.
+- `python3 /home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py --list` in `k_proxy` now detects ChromeCard on `/dev/hidraw0` (`vid:pid=4617:5`).
+- HID raw device nodes are now visible in `k_proxy`:
+  - `/dev/hidraw0` -> `crw-rw----+`
+  - `/dev/hidraw1` -> `crw-------`
+- `python3 /home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py --json` succeeds and returns CTAP2 `getInfo`:
+  - versions: `["FIDO_2_0"]`
+  - aaguid: `1234567890abcdef0123456789abcdef`
+  - options: `rk=false`, `up=true`, `uv=true`
+  - max_msg_size: `1024`
+- Local WebAuthn demo (`http://localhost:8765` in `k_proxy`) succeeded:
+  - register: `ok=true`, `username=alice`, `credential_count=1`
+  - login/auth: `ok=true`, `username=alice`, `authenticated=true`
+- Phase 5 prototype services are now available:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`
+- Remote VM access is now available via SSH/SCP aliases:
+  - command execution: `ssh <host> <cmd>`
+  - file copy to VM home: `scp <file> <host>:~`
+  - validated hosts: `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server`
 - `west` is not currently installed/in PATH: `west not found`.
 - The checked-out `CR_SDK_CK-main` tree appears incomplete for documented sysbuild role layout:
  - missing: `mvp`, `setup`, `components`, `samples`
 - `CR_SDK_CK-main/scripts/build_flash_mvp.sh` exists, but it expects the above role directories.
 - Python helper scripts were intentionally moved out of `CR_SDK_CK-main/scripts` and are now maintained at workspace root.
+- Qubes AppVM baseline is now up: `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server` can start and have terminals running.

 Implication:
- We cannot currently confirm live FIDO2 connectivity from this host.
+- Live FIDO2 connectivity from `k_proxy` to ChromeCard is confirmed over USB HID/CTAPHID.
+- Local browser WebAuthn register/login flow is confirmed working in `k_proxy`.
 - We cannot currently run the documented firmware build/flash flow.

 Session note (2026-04-24):
 - Markdown tracking was reviewed and normalized around `Setup.md` + `Workplan.md` as the active, continuously updated execution record.
+- AppVM template decision recorded: use `debian-13-xfce` for `k_client`, `k_proxy`, and `k_server`.
+- VM start attempt failed with Xen toolstack error: `libxenlight have failed to create new domain 'k_client'`.
+- VM start blocker was resolved by reducing VM memory to `400` MiB; all three AppVMs now start.
+- Runtime check from VMs: Debian `13.4` and Python `3.13.5`; `k_proxy` still shows `no hidraw devices`.
+- After USB assignment to `k_proxy`, `/dev/hidraw0` and `/dev/hidraw1` appeared.
+- CTAP probe re-run succeeded with detected ChromeCard device and valid CTAP2 `getInfo` response.
+- Local WebAuthn demo completed successfully for user `alice` (register + login).
+- Phase 5 starter implementation added with session TTL, logout/invalidation, and proxy->server protected counter forwarding.
+
+Session note (2026-04-24, doc maintenance):
+- Top-level Markdown files were re-scanned: `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`, `Setup.md`, `Workplan.md`.
+- `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md` remains consistent with the current Phase 5 prototype paths and flow.
+- No plan/setup drift was found requiring behavioral changes; docs remain aligned.
+- SSH-based VM operation was validated for `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server` (Debian `13.4` confirmed remotely).
+- SCP file transfer to `k_proxy` home directory was validated with read-back.
+
+Session note (2026-04-24, remote flow diagnostics):
+- VM script staging gap found: `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py`, `k_server_app.py`, and helper files were missing on AppVMs and were copied via `scp`.
+- Services were started in VMs and verified locally:
+  - `k_proxy` local health OK on `127.0.0.1:8770` and `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` local health OK on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+- Verified VM IPs during this run:
+  - `k_proxy`: `10.137.0.12`
+  - `k_server`: `10.137.0.13`
+  - `k_client`: `10.137.0.16`
+- Current chain failure is network pathing/firewall:
+- `k_client -> k_proxy` (`10.137.0.12:8771`) times out.
+- `k_proxy -> k_server` (`10.137.0.13:8780`) times out.
+- Proxy returns upstream error payload: `server unavailable: timed out`.
+
+Session note (2026-04-24, markdown re-scan):
+- Re-read top-level workspace Markdown files: `Setup.md`, `Workplan.md`, `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`.
+- Re-skimmed source-tree reference docs in `CR_SDK_CK-main`, including `BUILD.md`, `README.md`, `README_HOST.md`, `RELEASE.md`, and `distribute_bundle.md`.
+- Current workspace docs remain aligned with the verified execution record.
+- Source-tree doc drift remains unchanged:
+  - `README_HOST.md` still points to `./scripts/fido2_probe.py` and `./scripts/webauthn_local_demo.py`.
+  - Active workspace policy continues to treat those paths as historical; maintained helper paths remain `/home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py` and `/home/user/chromecard/webauthn_local_demo.py`.
+- Source-tree build docs continue to describe a full SDK layout with `mvp`, `setup`, `components`, and `samples`, which is still not present in the current local checkout snapshot.
+
+Session note (2026-04-24, policy retry):
+- Markdown re-scan was retried after local policy changes.
+- Re-running the workspace doc scan with a non-login shell completed cleanly, without the earlier SSH/socat startup noise in command output.
+
+Session note (2026-04-24, chain probe retry):
+- Re-probed the Qubes access path for `k_client -> k_proxy -> k_server`.
+- Local forwarded SSH listener ports still exist on the host:
+  - `0.0.0.0:2222` -> `qrexec-client-vm 'k_client' qubes.ConnectTCP+22`
+  - `0.0.0.0:2223` -> `qrexec-client-vm 'k_proxy' qubes.ConnectTCP+22`
+  - `0.0.0.0:2224` -> `qrexec-client-vm 'k_server' qubes.ConnectTCP+22`
+- These forwarded SSH ports currently fail immediately:
+  - `ssh k_client` / `ssh k_proxy` / `ssh k_server` close immediately on localhost forwarded ports.
+  - Direct `qrexec-client-vm <target> qubes.ConnectTCP+22` returns `Request refused`.
+- Chain ports are currently blocked at the same qrexec layer:
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_proxy qubes.ConnectTCP+8770` -> `Request refused`
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_server qubes.ConnectTCP+8780` -> `Request refused`
+- This means the current blocker is active qrexec policy/service refusal for `qubes.ConnectTCP`, not the Python service code in `k_proxy_app.py` or `k_server_app.py`.
+- Separate SSH config issue remains on the host:
+  - `/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/20-systemd-ssh-proxy.conf` is still owned `root:root` but mode `777`, which causes OpenSSH to reject it as insecure on the normal login-shell path.
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, post-restart probe):
+- Correct client-facing proxy port is `8771` for the current split-VM chain checks.
+- SSH to `k_proxy` is working again.
+- `k_proxy` card visibility is restored after VM restart and card reconnect:
+  - `/dev/hidraw0` and `/dev/hidraw1` are present in `k_proxy`
+- Current service state after restart:
+  - `k_proxy` has no listener on `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` has no listener on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+- Current qrexec chain state after restart:
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_proxy qubes.ConnectTCP+8771` -> `Request refused`
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_server qubes.ConnectTCP+8780` -> `Request refused`
+- Practical meaning:
+  - SSH and card attachment recovered
+  - phase-5 app services are not currently running in the VMs
+  - qrexec forwarding for the chain ports is still being refused
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, service restart):
+- `k_server_app.py` was restarted successfully in `k_server`:
+  - PID `1320`
+  - listening on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+  - `/health` returns `{"ok": true, "service": "k_server", ...}`
+- `k_proxy_app.py` was restarted successfully in `k_proxy`:
+  - PID `2774`
+  - listening on `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `/health` returns `{"ok": true, "service": "k_proxy", "active_sessions": 0, ...}`
+- Despite local service recovery, qrexec forwarding is still denied:
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_proxy qubes.ConnectTCP+8771` -> `Request refused`
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_server qubes.ConnectTCP+8780` -> `Request refused`
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, markdown refresh):
+- Re-read the active workspace markdown files:
+  - `Setup.md`
+  - `Workplan.md`
+  - `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`
+- Corrected the Phase 5 runbook to distinguish the old same-VM quickstart from the current split-VM chain usage.
+- Current documented client-facing proxy port for split-VM tests is `8771`.
+- Current documented blocker remains unchanged:
+  - local service health inside `k_proxy` and `k_server` is good
+  - inter-VM forwarding via `qubes.ConnectTCP` is still refused
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, Phase 2 HTTPS bring-up):
+- Added direct TLS support to:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py`
+- Added local certificate generator:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/generate_phase2_certs.py`
+- Generated local CA and service certs at:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_proxy.crt`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/k_server.crt`
+- Certificate generation was corrected to include subject key identifier and authority key identifier so Python TLS verification succeeds.
+- Current validated HTTPS shape is Qubes-localhost forwarding, not raw VM-IP routing:
+  - in `k_client`: `qvm-connect-tcp 9771:k_proxy:8771`
+  - in `k_proxy`: `qvm-connect-tcp 9780:k_server:8780`
+  - `k_proxy` listens on `https://127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` listens on `https://127.0.0.1:8780`
+  - `k_proxy` upstream is `https://127.0.0.1:9780`
+- Verified HTTPS checks:
+  - `k_client -> k_proxy` `/health` over TLS succeeds with `--cacert /home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt`
+  - `k_proxy -> k_server` `/health` and `/resource/counter` over TLS succeed through the `9780` forwarder
+  - end-to-end `k_client -> k_proxy -> k_server` login + session reuse succeeded over HTTPS
+- End-to-end verified results:
+  - login returned `ok=true` for `alice`
+  - first protected counter call returned value `1`
+  - second protected counter call returned value `2`
+  - session status remained valid after reuse
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, Phase 2.5 ownership and concurrency):
+- Current prototype state ownership is now explicit:
+  - `k_proxy` is authoritative for session state
+  - `k_server` is authoritative for protected resource state
+  - `k_client` is not authoritative for either session validity or counter/resource state
+- Current session model in `k_proxy`:
+  - server-side in-memory session store only
+  - opaque bearer token generated by `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)`
+  - per-session fields are `username` and `expires_at`
+  - expiry is enforced in `k_proxy`; `k_server` does not validate client sessions directly
+- Current resource model in `k_server`:
+  - in-memory monotonic counter guarded by a lock
+  - access allowed only when request arrives from `k_proxy` with the expected `X-Proxy-Token`
+- Current concurrency model in code:
+  - both services use `ThreadingHTTPServer`
+  - `k_proxy` protects session-map mutations and garbage collection with a single lock
+  - `k_server` protects counter increments with a single lock
+  - TLS verification and upstream fetches happen outside the session lock in `k_proxy`
+- Current runtime assumptions and limits:
+  - Qubes localhost forwarders are treated as transport plumbing, not as state authorities
+  - if `k_proxy` restarts, in-memory sessions are lost
+  - if `k_server` restarts, the in-memory counter resets
+  - the current shared `X-Proxy-Token` is a prototype trust mechanism, not a final authorization design
+- Practical meaning:
+  - race-free behavior is currently defined for session CRUD and counter increments inside one process per VM
+  - persistence, distributed session authority, and multi-proxy/multi-server coordination are not implemented yet
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, Phase 6 client portal prototype):
+- Added browser-facing client process:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_client_portal.py`
+- Current Phase 6 prototype shape:
+  - portal runs in `k_client` on `http://127.0.0.1:8766`
+  - portal keeps local enrolled username state in `k_client`
+  - portal calls `k_proxy` over the validated TLS forward `https://127.0.0.1:9771`
+- Current local enrollment model:
+  - enrollment is a client-local username selection stored by the portal
+  - no dedicated server-side enrollment API exists yet
+- Verified portal API flow in `k_client`:
+  - `GET /health` returns `ok=true`
+  - `POST /api/enroll` with `alice` succeeds
+  - `POST /api/login` succeeds and returns a proxy session token
+  - `POST /api/status` succeeds
+  - `POST /api/resource/counter` succeeds twice with upstream values `3` and `4`
+  - `POST /api/logout` succeeds
+- Current implication:
+  - `k_client` now has a concrete client-side process instead of only runbook curls
+  - browser-facing flow is now available through the local portal
+  - next hardening step is to replace client-local enrollment with the intended enrollment contract and decide whether browser traffic should eventually talk to `k_proxy` directly or continue through a local client portal
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, Phase 6 enrollment contract):
+- Added proxy-side enrollment API and storage:
+  - `POST /enroll/register`
+  - `GET /enroll/status?username=<name>`
+  - persisted prototype store at `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_enrollments.json` in `k_proxy`
+- Current enrollment authority is now `k_proxy`, not the `k_client` portal.
+- Current portal behavior:
+  - portal enrollment calls `k_proxy` over TLS
+  - portal keeps only a preferred local username for convenience
+  - portal login now depends on proxy-side enrollment existing
+- Verified behavior:
+  - direct proxy login for unenrolled `bob` returns `{"ok": false, "error": "user not enrolled", ...}`
+  - portal enrollment of `alice` succeeds and persists in proxy-side enrollment storage
+  - proxy enrollment status for `alice` returns `ok=true`
+  - portal login and protected counter access still succeed after enrollment
+- Practical meaning:
+  - Phase 6 now has a real `k_client -> k_proxy` enrollment request path
+  - the remaining gap is not basic routing; it is deciding the final enrollment semantics and whether the browser should stay behind a local portal or talk to `k_proxy` directly
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, browser target moved to k_proxy):
+- `k_proxy` now serves the browser-facing portal UI directly on `/` over `https://127.0.0.1:9771`.
+- `k_client_portal.py` is now a temporary bridge page:
+  - it points users to `https://127.0.0.1:9771/`
+  - it is no longer the primary browser target
+- Verified direct browser/API target behavior from `k_client`:
+  - `GET https://127.0.0.1:9771/` returns the proxy portal HTML
+  - `GET https://127.0.0.1:9771/health` returns `ok=true`
+  - direct `POST /enroll/register` for `carol` succeeds
+  - direct `POST /session/login` for `carol` succeeds
+- Current implication:
+  - browser traffic is now intended to go straight to `k_proxy`
+  - the `k_client` portal remains only as a temporary bridge/compatibility layer
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, k_client browser flow page):
+- `k_client_portal.py` now also serves a local browser demo page again on `http://127.0.0.1:8766` inside `k_client`.
+- The page is useful as an operator/demo surface:
+  - register user
+  - login with card approval or denial in `k_proxy`
+  - call the protected `k_server` counter
+  - logout
+- The page now also exposes current proxy enrollment state:
+  - shows the registered users visible in `k_proxy`
+  - lets the operator select a listed user into the username field
+  - lets the operator unregister users from the browser page
+  - login now uses the current username field instead of only the portal's last remembered user
+- Added a browser regression harness for the `k_client` page:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/tests/k_client_portal.spec.js`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/playwright.config.js`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/package.json`
+  - intended flow: register, login, call `k_server`, logout, unregister
+  - verified passing live on 2026-04-25 from this host via forwarded portal URL:
+    - `PORTAL_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18766 npm run test:k-client`
+- It also makes the negative path explicit:
+  - if login is denied on the card, the page reports that `k_server` was not called
+- Primary browser-facing app logic still lives on `k_proxy`, but the `k_client` page is now a concrete demo/control surface rather than just a redirect.
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, provisional enrollment hardening):
+- The enrollment contract in `k_proxy` is now explicit but provisional.
+- Current prototype enrollment rules:
+  - usernames are canonicalized to lowercase
+  - allowed username pattern is `3-32` chars using lowercase letters, digits, `.`, `_`, `-`
+  - optional `display_name` is allowed up to `64` chars
+  - enrollment create is create-only and duplicate create returns `user already enrolled`
+  - enrollment update is a separate operation
+  - enrollment delete is a separate operation and removes any active sessions for that username
+- Current enrollment endpoints on `k_proxy`:
+  - `POST /enroll/register`
+  - `GET /enroll/status?username=<name>`
+  - `POST /enroll/update`
+  - `POST /enroll/delete`
+  - `GET /enroll/list`
+- Verified behavior from `k_client` against `https://127.0.0.1:9771`:
+  - invalid username `A!` is rejected
+  - create for `dave` with `display_name` succeeds
+  - duplicate create for `dave` is rejected
+  - update for `dave` succeeds
+  - list returns enrolled users and metadata
+  - delete for `dave` succeeds
+  - login for deleted `dave` fails with `user not enrolled`
+- Deliberate current limit:
+  - enrollment itself still does not require card presence; only login does
+  - this was kept lightweight because the enrollment semantics are expected to change later
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, Phase 6.5 concurrency probe):
+- Added reproducible concurrency probe:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/phase65_concurrency_probe.py`
+  - probe now supports `--max-workers` so client-side fan-out can be swept explicitly
+- Successful baseline run from `k_client` against direct proxy path:
+  - `3` users
+  - `4` protected requests per user
+  - `12/12` requests succeeded
+  - counter values were unique and contiguous from `6` to `17`
+  - max observed latency was about `457 ms`
+- Larger follow-up run exposed current limit:
+  - `5` users
+  - `5` protected requests per user
+  - `18/25` requests succeeded
+  - failures returned TLS EOF / upstream unavailable errors
+  - successful counter values were still unique and contiguous from `18` to `35`
+  - max observed latency was about `758 ms`
+- Additional Phase 6.5 diagnosis:
+  - fixed a keep-alive/body-drain bug in the HTTP/1.1 experiment so `k_server` no longer misparses follow-on requests as `{}POST`
+  - added an upstream connection pool in `k_proxy`; current default/test setting clamps `k_proxy -> k_server` to one pooled TLS connection
+  - despite that change, a full fan-out run with `25` in-flight protected calls still fails on client-observed TLS EOFs
+  - a worker-limited run now passes cleanly:
+    - `5` users
+    - `5` protected requests per user
+    - `25/25` requests succeeded with `--max-workers 10`
+  - raising client-side fan-out still breaks:
+    - `22/25` requests succeeded with `--max-workers 15`
+    - `15/25` requests succeeded with fully unbounded `25` workers in the latest rerun
+- Current diagnosis:
+  - the protected counter and session logic stay correct under load; successful values remain unique and contiguous
+  - `k_proxy` and `k_server` can complete the requests that actually reach them
+  - the primary collapse point in current testing is the client-facing Qubes forwarder on `9771`
+  - `qvm_connect_9771.log` shows `qrexec-agent-data` / data-vchan failures and repeated `xs_transaction_start: No space left on device`
+  - `qvm_connect_9780.log` also showed earlier qrexec failures, but the latest worker-threshold evidence points first to connection fan-out on `k_client -> k_proxy`
+- Practical meaning:
+  - the application logic is good for moderate concurrent use in the current prototype
+  - the direct browser path appears stable around `10` in-flight protected calls in the current Qubes setup
+  - the current concurrency ceiling is being set by Qubes forwarding behavior rather than by the monotonic counter logic
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, in-VM forwarding test):
+- Tested the intended in-VM forwarding path with `qvm-connect-tcp` instead of host-side `qrexec-client-vm`.
+- Forwarders start and bind locally:
+  - in `k_client`: `qvm-connect-tcp 8771:k_proxy:8771` binds `localhost:8771`
+  - in `k_proxy`: `qvm-connect-tcp 8780:k_server:8780` binds `localhost:8780`
+- But the actual client->proxy connection is still refused when used:
+  - `k_client` forward log shows `Request refused`
+  - `socat` reports child exit status `126` and `Connection reset by peer`
+- Local login on `k_proxy` reaches the app but fails on the auth dependency:
+  - `POST /session/login` to `http://127.0.0.1:8771` returns `401`
+  - details: `Missing dependency: python-fido2 ... No module named 'fido2'`
+- `k_server` was not reached during this login test; current `k_server.log` only shows `/health`.
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, after python3-fido2 install):
+- `k_proxy` was restarted after `python3-fido2` installation and now listens again on `127.0.0.1:8771`.
+- The previous Python import blocker is resolved; local login now reaches the CTAP probe path.
+- Current local login result on `k_proxy`:
+  - `{"ok": false, "error": "card auth failed", "details": "No CTAP HID devices found."}`
+- Current forwarded login result from `k_client` is still not completing:
+  - `curl http://127.0.0.1:8771/session/login` -> `Empty reply from server`
+  - `qvm_connect_8771.log` still shows repeated `Request refused` and child exit status `126`
+- Practical meaning:
+  - Python dependency issue in `k_proxy` is fixed
+  - card access inside `k_proxy` is currently missing again at CTAP/HID level
+  - `k_client -> k_proxy` qrexec forwarding is still effectively denied/refused
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, card reattached):
+- Card visibility in `k_proxy` is restored again:
+  - `/dev/hidraw0` and `/dev/hidraw1` present
+  - `fido2_probe.py --list` detects ChromeCard on `/dev/hidraw0`
+- Local login on `k_proxy` now succeeds again:
+  - `POST /session/login` on `127.0.0.1:8771` returns `200`
+  - session creation for user `alice` succeeded
+- Remaining failure is isolated to the client-facing qrexec path:
+  - `k_client` -> `localhost:8771` through `qvm-connect-tcp` still returns `Empty reply from server`
+  - `qvm_connect_8771.log` still shows `Request refused`
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, clean forward retest):
+- Re-ran both forwards and exercised each hop immediately after local bind.
+- `k_proxy -> k_server`:
+  - `qvm-connect-tcp 8780:k_server:8780` binds `localhost:8780` in `k_proxy`
+  - first real `POST /resource/counter` through that forward returns `Empty reply from server`
+  - `qvm_connect_8780.log` then records `Request refused` with child exit status `126`
+- `k_client -> k_proxy`:
+  - `qvm-connect-tcp 8771:k_proxy:8771` binds `localhost:8771` in `k_client`
+  - first real `POST /session/login` through that forward returns `Empty reply from server`
+  - `qvm_connect_8771.log` records `Request refused` with child exit status `126`
+- Conclusion from this retest:
+  - both forwards fail in the same way
+  - local bind succeeds, but the actual qrexec `qubes.ConnectTCP` request is refused when the first connection is attempted
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, dom0 policy fix validated):
+- After changing dom0 policy to use explicit destination VMs instead of `@default` for `qubes.ConnectTCP`, both forwards now work.
+- Verified hop 1:
+  - in `k_proxy`, `POST http://127.0.0.1:8780/resource/counter` with `X-Proxy-Token: dev-proxy-token` succeeds
+  - response included counter value `1`
+- Verified hop 2:
+  - in `k_client`, `POST http://127.0.0.1:8771/session/login` succeeds
+  - session token is returned through the `k_client -> k_proxy` forward
+- Verified full end-to-end flow from `k_client`:
+  - login succeeded and returned session token
+  - `POST /session/status` succeeded
+  - `POST /resource/counter` succeeded twice with upstream values `2` and `3`
+  - `POST /session/logout` succeeded
+  - post-logout `POST /resource/counter` correctly returned `401 invalid or expired session`
+- Current conclusion:
+  - `k_client -> k_proxy -> k_server` chain is operational
+  - session reuse and logout behavior are working in the current prototype
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, live chain re-validation and regression helper):
+- Re-validated the split-VM chain after restart using the current TLS/localhost-forward shape:
+  - `k_client` local `9771` -> `k_proxy:8771`
+  - `k_proxy` local `9780` -> `k_server:8780`
+- Verified live service state during this run:
+  - `k_server` local `https://127.0.0.1:8780/health` returned `ok=true`
+  - `k_proxy` local `https://127.0.0.1:8771/health` returned `ok=true`
+  - `k_proxy` local `https://127.0.0.1:9780/health` reached `k_server`
+  - `k_client` local `https://127.0.0.1:9771/health` reached `k_proxy`
+- Verified end-to-end behavior from `k_client`:
+  - login for `alice` succeeded
+  - session status succeeded
+  - protected counter calls succeeded with session reuse
+  - logout succeeded
+  - post-logout protected access returned `401 invalid or expired session`
+- Added reproducible regression helper at:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh`
+- Verified the new helper end-to-end on 2026-04-25:
+  - default run uses `20` requests at parallelism `8`
+  - returned values were unique and gap-free
+  - latest verified counter range from the helper was `43..62`
+- Practical meaning:
+  - the current blocker is no longer Qubes forwarding for the base Phase 5 chain
+  - the current next-step gap is auth semantics, not transport bring-up
+
+Session note (2026-04-25, direct FIDO2 auth attempt):
+- Added an experimental direct FIDO2 path in `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py`:
+  - runtime switch: `--auth-mode fido2-direct`
+  - default runtime remains `probe`
+- Added a low-level CTAP helper at `/home/user/chromecard/raw_ctap_probe.py`:
+  - purpose: bypass `Fido2Client` and exercise raw CTAP2 `makeCredential` / `getAssertion`
+  - logs keepalive callbacks and exact transport exceptions for host-side debugging
+- Direct-mode intent:
+  - replace the legacy `fido2_probe.py --json` session gate
+  - perform real credential registration and real assertion verification locally in `k_proxy` with `python-fido2`
+- Current observed blocker on `k_proxy`:
+  - direct `make_credential` fails with `No compatible PIN/UV protocols supported!`
+  - reproduces outside the app in a minimal VM-side probe, so this is not just a handler bug
+  - likely cause is the current card / `python-fido2` stack selecting a PIN/UV-dependent CTAP2 path for registration
+- Additional probe:
+  - a forced CTAP1 fallback experiment did not fail immediately, but also did not complete quickly enough to treat as a usable working path in this turn
+- Latest live blocker (2026-04-25, after refactor/deploy):
+  - direct probing is currently blocked before the card Yes/No UI stage because `k_proxy` no longer sees any CTAP HID device
+  - `ssh k_proxy "python3 /home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py --list"` now returns `No CTAP HID devices found.`
+  - `ssh k_proxy "ls -l /dev/hidraw*"` shows no `hidraw` nodes at the moment
+- Follow-up after card reattach (2026-04-25):
+  - `k_proxy` again shows `/dev/hidraw0` and `/dev/hidraw1`
+  - direct node-open check confirms `/dev/hidraw0` is readable as the normal user
+  - `/dev/hidraw1` still returns `PermissionError: [Errno 13] Permission denied`
+  - raw `makeCredential` probe still produced no on-card registration prompt, so the host path is hanging before the firmware Yes/No UI
+  - hidraw mapping confirms `/dev/hidraw0` is the FIDO interface:
+    - report descriptor begins with usage page `0xF1D0`
+    - `get_descriptor('/dev/hidraw0')` returns `report_size_in=64`, `report_size_out=64`
+  - `/dev/hidraw1` is a separate vendor HID interface with usage page `0xFF00`
+  - stale Python probes holding `/dev/hidraw0` were cleared, but behavior did not change
+  - a manual CTAPHID `INIT` packet sent directly to `/dev/hidraw0` writes successfully and still gets no response within `3s`
+  - this places the current blocker below `python-fido2`: raw HID traffic is not getting a CTAPHID reply after the latest reattach
+  - `webauthn_local_demo.py` was re-run inside `k_proxy` after reattach and still produced no card prompt on register
+  - that confirms the current failure is below both the browser WebAuthn path and the direct `python-fido2` path
+  - after a full power cycle and reattach, manual CTAPHID `INIT` on `/dev/hidraw0` started replying again
+  - `webauthn_local_demo.py` register in `k_proxy` then succeeded again, confirming the card transport was recovered by the power cycle
+  - direct host-side registration via `raw_ctap_probe.py --device-path /dev/hidraw0 make-credential --rp-id localhost` also succeeded again after pressing `yes` on the card
+  - returned credential material included:
+    - `fmt="none"`
+    - credential id `7986cfcf45663f625eb7fc7b52640d83cf3d0e8a6627eeadaba3126406b1e0b8`
+  - this confirms the recovered direct path now reaches the real card confirmation UI and completes CTAP2 `makeCredential`
+  - `k_proxy_app.py --auth-mode fido2-direct` was then patched to:
+    - use low-level CTAP2 instead of the higher-level `Fido2Client` registration/assertion calls
+    - open the explicit FIDO node `/dev/hidraw0` instead of scanning devices
+    - cache the direct device handle instead of reopening it for each operation
+  - current remaining blocker:
+    - was narrowed through repeated retries to a mix of hidraw node disappearance, older `python-fido2` response-mapping requirements, and CTAP payload-shape mismatches
+  - latest verified state:
+    - after reattach with healthy CTAPHID `INIT`, real app registration through `k_proxy_app.py --auth-mode fido2-direct` now succeeds
+    - `/enroll/register` for `directtest` returned `ok=true` and `has_credential=true`
+    - real app login through `/session/login` for `directtest` also now succeeds after card confirmation
+    - returned `auth_mode` is `fido2_assertion`
+    - session status succeeds
+    - protected `/resource/counter` access succeeds again through `k_proxy -> k_server`
+    - logout succeeds
+    - post-logout protected access returns `401`
+    - direct mode no longer depends on a fixed `/dev/hidraw0` path
+    - after a later re-enumeration where the card appeared on `/dev/hidraw1`, `k_proxy_app.py` was patched to probe available `/dev/hidraw*` nodes and select the first working CTAPHID device automatically
+    - browser registration then worked again without changing the configured `--direct-device-path`
+  - temporary direct-mode hidraw lifetime logging has been removed again after diagnosis
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh` now supports the direct-auth baseline via:
+    - `--interactive-card`
+    - `--login-timeout`
+    - `--expect-auth-mode fido2_assertion`
+- Practical outcome for this session:
+  - the experimental direct mode is kept in code for follow-up work
+  - the deployed `k_proxy` service was restored to default `probe` mode
+  - verified `alice` login still works afterward, so the validated Phase 5 baseline remains intact
+
+Session note (2026-04-27, fido2-direct end-to-end browser validation):
+- Deployed all three services (k_server, k_proxy, k_client_portal) in split-VM chain via SSH/SCP.
+- k_proxy restarted with --auth-mode fido2-direct.
+- Full browser flow verified from k_client at http://127.0.0.1:8766 with real card:
+  - Register: makeCredential triggered on card, button press confirmed.
+  - Login: getAssertion triggered on card, button press confirmed.
+  - Counter: k_server returned incremented value.
+  - Logout: session correctly invalidated.
+- Confirmed: probe mode showed stale directtest enrollment (no credential_data_b64) from earlier session; that is expected.
+- Bug found and fixed: clicking Register after Login cleared the client-side session token but left the server-side session alive; fix adds a best-effort /session/logout call to k_proxy before re-enrolling.
+- Current deployed service state:
+  - k_server: https://127.0.0.1:8780, TLS, proxy-token dev-proxy-token
+  - k_proxy: https://127.0.0.1:8771, TLS, --auth-mode fido2-direct, upstream https://127.0.0.1:9780
+  - k_client: http://127.0.0.1:8766, proxy-base-url https://127.0.0.1:9771
+  - Forwards: k_proxy 9780->k_server:8780, k_client 9771->k_proxy:8771
+- Unit test suite added: tests/test_k_proxy.py (100 tests, all passing, run locally with python3 -m unittest tests/test_k_proxy.py).
+
+Session note (2026-04-26, markdown maintenance re-scan):
+- Re-read the maintained workspace markdown set:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/Setup.md`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/Workplan.md`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`
+- Re-checked that the currently referenced runtime artifacts still exist in the workspace:
+  - `k_proxy_app.py`
+  - `k_server_app.py`
+  - `k_client_portal.py`
+  - `phase5_chain_regression.sh`
+  - `raw_ctap_probe.py`
+  - `generate_phase2_certs.py`
+  - `tls/phase2/ca.crt`
+  - `tls/phase2/k_proxy.crt`
+  - `tls/phase2/k_server.crt`
+- Current documentation conclusion:
+  - the workspace still supports the HTTPS localhost-forwarded split-VM chain as the active baseline
+  - direct FIDO2 enrollment/login support exists in code and is documented as an optional follow-up path, not the default deployed runtime
+  - the main unresolved engineering limit is still the higher-fan-out Qubes forwarding ceiling on the browser-facing path, not basic chain bring-up

 ## Known FIDO2 Transport Boundary

@ -151,6 +673,9 @@ SUBSYSTEM=="hidraw", ATTRS{idVendor}=="1209", ATTRS{idProduct}=="0005", MODE="06
 - `python3 /home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py --list`
 - Then:
 - `python3 /home/user/chromecard/fido2_probe.py --json`
+- For raw CTAP debugging on `k_proxy`:
+- `python3 /home/user/chromecard/raw_ctap_probe.py info`
+- `python3 /home/user/chromecard/raw_ctap_probe.py make-credential --rp-id localhost`

 4. Run local WebAuthn bring-up demo.
 - `python3 /home/user/chromecard/webauthn_local_demo.py`
@ -179,13 +704,18 @@ SUBSYSTEM=="hidraw", ATTRS{idVendor}=="1209", ATTRS{idProduct}=="0005", MODE="06

 ## Open Gaps To Resolve

- Why no `/dev/hidraw*` device is visible despite USB connection.
- Whether udev rule is missing or device VID/PID differs from expected.
- Whether current firmware on card exposes the FIDO2 HID interface.
 - Whether a full `CR_SDK_CK-main` checkout (with role directories) is available locally.
 - Whether server-side code should be pulled now for broader CIP/WebAuthn integration testing.
- Exact Qubes firewall and service binding rules to enforce the `k_client -> k_proxy -> k_server` chain.
 - Exact enrollment process interface running in `k_client` and how it reaches `k_proxy`.
- Concrete session format/lifetime so cached sessions reduce card prompts without weakening security.
+- Upgrade Phase 5 auth gate from card-presence probe to full WebAuthn assertion verification for session creation.
+- Determine the viable path for real credential registration on `k_proxy`:
+  - enable whatever PIN/UV support the card expects for direct CTAP2 registration, or
+  - adopt a different one-time enrollment path that can persist real credential material for later direct assertion verification.
+- Restore card visibility inside `k_proxy` so direct probes can reach the card UI again:
+  - `/dev/hidraw*` must exist in `k_proxy`
+  - `fido2_probe.py --list` must detect the card before the raw Yes/No probe can continue
+- Identify why the host probe hangs before card UI even with `/dev/hidraw0` readable:
+  - determine why CTAPHID `INIT` on the correct FIDO hidraw node receives no reply after reattach
+  - likely recovery targets are the Qubes USB mediation path, a fresh USB reassign, or a `k_proxy` VM/device reset
 - Precise ownership split of session/user state between `k_proxy` and `k_server`.
 - Concrete concurrency limits and acceptance criteria (requests/sec, parallel clients, latency/error thresholds).
--- a/Workplan.md
+++ b/Workplan.md
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Workplan

-Last updated: 2026-04-24
+Last updated: 2026-04-27

 This is the execution plan for making ChromeCard FIDO2 development and validation reproducible on this machine.

@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ This is the execution plan for making ChromeCard FIDO2 development and validatio

 - Treat `/home/user/chromecard/CR_SDK_CK-main` as read-only.
 - Keep helper scripts such as `fido2_probe.py` and `webauthn_local_demo.py` at `/home/user/chromecard`.
- Target deployment model is Qubes OS with 3 Debian-based AppVMs: `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server`.
+- Target deployment model is Qubes OS with 3 AppVMs based on `debian-13-xfce`: `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server`.
 - Current authenticator link is card->`k_proxy` (USB), but architecture must allow migration to wireless phone-mediated validation.
+- VM execution path is SSH-first for experiments: `ssh <host> <cmd>` and `scp <file> <host>:~`.

 ## Goals

@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ This is the execution plan for making ChromeCard FIDO2 development and validatio
 ## Phase 0: Qubes VM Baseline (Blocking)

 1. Provision/verify AppVMs.
- Ensure `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server` exist and are based on the Debian template.
+- Ensure `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server` exist and are based on `debian-13-xfce`.

 2. Assign functional responsibilities.
 - `k_client`: browser client + enrollment process.
@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ This is the execution plan for making ChromeCard FIDO2 development and validatio
 Exit criteria:
 - All 3 VMs exist, boot, and have clearly defined service ownership.

-## Phase 1: Qubes Firewall Policy (Blocking)
+## Phase 1: Qubes Firewall Policy

 1. Enforce allowed forward paths only.
 - Allow `k_client` outbound TLS only to `k_proxy` service port(s).
@ -58,6 +59,33 @@ Exit criteria:
 Exit criteria:
 - Policy matches intended chain and is test-verified.

+Status (2026-04-24, remote diagnostics):
+- Confirmed active blocker remains Phase 1 network policy/pathing.
+- Evidence from live VM probes:
+  - `k_client (10.137.0.16) -> k_proxy (10.137.0.12:8771)`: TCP timeout.
+  - `k_proxy (10.137.0.12) -> k_server (10.137.0.13:8780)`: upstream timeout.
+- Local service health inside each VM is good, so failure is inter-VM reachability, not local process startup.
+
+Status (2026-04-25, after restart and service recovery):
+- Refined blocker: this is currently a qrexec/`qubes.ConnectTCP` refusal problem, not an app-local listener problem.
+- Current evidence:
+  - `k_proxy` local `/health` is up on `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` local `/health` is up on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_proxy qubes.ConnectTCP+8771` -> `Request refused`
+  - `qrexec-client-vm k_server qubes.ConnectTCP+8780` -> `Request refused`
+- Immediate next action for Phase 1:
+  - verify and fix the dom0 policy/mechanism that should permit `qubes.ConnectTCP` forwarding for the chain ports
+
+Status (2026-04-25, dom0 policy fix validated):
+- The forwarding blocker is cleared for the current prototype shape.
+- Verified working chain:
+  - `k_client` localhost `9771` -> `k_proxy:8771`
+  - `k_proxy` localhost `9780` -> `k_server:8780`
+- Verified outcome:
+  - TLS health checks pass on both hops
+  - end-to-end login, session status, protected counter access, and logout all succeed from `k_client`
+- Phase 1 is complete for the current localhost-forwarded `qubes.ConnectTCP` design.
+
 ## Phase 2: TLS Certificates and Service Endpoints

 1. Certificate model.
@ -76,6 +104,19 @@ Exit criteria:
 - Mutual TLS trust decisions are documented and tested.
 - HTTPS calls succeed on both links with expected cert validation.

+Status (2026-04-25):
+- Implemented HTTPS listeners in both prototype services.
+- Added local CA + service certificate generation in `generate_phase2_certs.py`.
+- Verified the working Qubes path is localhost forwarding plus TLS:
+  - `k_client` local `9771` forwards to `k_proxy:8771`
+  - `k_proxy` local `9780` forwards to `k_server:8780`
+- Verified cert validation on both hops using the generated CA.
+- Verified end-to-end HTTPS flow:
+  - `k_client -> k_proxy` login over TLS
+  - `k_proxy -> k_server` protected counter call over TLS
+  - session reuse still works across repeated protected requests
+- Phase 2 is now effectively complete for the current prototype shape.
+
 ## Phase 2.5: Define State Ownership and Concurrency Model

 1. State ownership.
@ -92,6 +133,32 @@ Exit criteria:
 Exit criteria:
 - Architecture clearly documents state authority and race-free update rules.

+Next action (2026-04-25):
+- Move into Phase 2.5 and make the current prototype decisions explicit:
+  - authority for session state remains `k_proxy`
+  - `k_server` remains authority for the protected counter/resource state
+  - localhost Qubes forwarders are part of the active runtime model for the two TLS hops
+  - define concurrency assumptions and limits around session store, forwarders, and counter access
+
+Status (2026-04-25):
+- Current ownership model is now explicit:
+  - `k_proxy` is authoritative for session creation, expiry, lookup, and logout
+  - `k_server` is authoritative for the protected monotonic counter
+  - `k_client` is a client only; it holds bearer tokens but is not a state authority
+- Current validation boundary is explicit:
+  - `k_proxy` validates bearer tokens against its in-memory session store
+  - `k_server` trusts only requests that arrive with the configured `X-Proxy-Token`
+  - `k_server` does not currently validate end-user session tokens directly
+- Current concurrency strategy is explicit:
+  - `k_proxy` uses `ThreadingHTTPServer` plus one lock around the in-memory session map
+  - `k_server` uses `ThreadingHTTPServer` plus one lock around counter increments
+  - upstream HTTPS calls from `k_proxy` are made outside the session-store lock
+- Current runtime limits are explicit:
+  - sessions are process-local and disappear on `k_proxy` restart
+  - counter state is process-local and resets on `k_server` restart
+  - transport relies on Qubes localhost forwarders `9771` and `9780`
+- Phase 2.5 is complete for the current prototype shape.
+
 ## Phase 3: Recover Basic Device Visibility on `k_proxy` (Blocking)

 1. Verify physical + USB enumeration path.
@ -129,6 +196,11 @@ Exit criteria:
 Exit criteria:
 - Register and login both complete with card interaction prompts.

+Status (2026-04-24):
+- Completed in `k_proxy` using `http://localhost:8765`.
+- Registration result: `ok=true`, `username=alice`, `credential_count=1`.
+- Authentication result: `ok=true`, `username=alice`, `authenticated=true`.
+
 ## Phase 5: Implement Proxy Auth + Session Reuse

 1. Authenticate via card once per session window.
@ -148,6 +220,47 @@ Exit criteria:
 - Repeated authorized requests do not require card interaction until session expiry.
 - Expired/invalid sessions are correctly rejected.

+Status (2026-04-24):
+- Started with a runnable prototype:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`
+- Implemented in prototype:
+  - session create/status/logout endpoints in `k_proxy`
+  - TTL-based server-side session store with expiry garbage collection
+  - protected monotonic counter endpoint in `k_server` with thread-safe increments
+  - proxy forwarding from `k_proxy` to `k_server` using a shared upstream token
+- Current auth gate for session creation is card-presence probe (`fido2_probe.py --json`), pending upgrade to full assertion verification path.
+
+Status (2026-04-25):
+- Prototype services were re-started successfully after VM restart.
+- Current split-VM test shape is:
+  - `k_proxy` listening on `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` listening on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+- End-to-end validation is now passing through the live chain from `k_client`.
+- Current verified behavior:
+  - login succeeds for `alice`
+  - session status succeeds
+  - repeated protected counter requests succeed with session reuse
+  - logout succeeds
+  - post-logout protected access returns `401`
+- Added repeatable host-side regression helper:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh`
+- Phase 5 is complete for the current prototype semantics.
+- Experimental follow-up in code:
+  - `k_proxy_app.py` now also has `--auth-mode fido2-direct`
+  - this mode attempts direct credential registration and direct assertion verification with `python-fido2`
+  - it is not the deployed default because direct registration currently fails on `k_proxy` with `No compatible PIN/UV protocols supported!`
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/raw_ctap_probe.py` now exists for lower-level CTAP2 probing with keepalive/error logging
+  - latest retry result: after reattaching the card, `k_proxy` again exposes `/dev/hidraw0` and `/dev/hidraw1`, but raw `makeCredential` still reaches no Yes/No card prompt
+  - `/dev/hidraw0` opens successfully as the normal user; `/dev/hidraw1` is still permission-denied
+  - manual CTAPHID testing now shows `/dev/hidraw0` is the correct FIDO interface and a direct `INIT` write gets no response at all
+  - rerunning `webauthn_local_demo.py` inside `k_proxy` also still gives no card prompt, so the current break is below both browser WebAuthn and direct host probes
+  - after a full power cycle and reattach, manual CTAPHID `INIT` replies again and browser registration in `webauthn_local_demo.py` succeeds again
+  - direct `raw_ctap_probe.py --device-path /dev/hidraw0 make-credential --rp-id localhost` now also succeeds again after card confirmation
+  - `k_proxy_app.py --auth-mode fido2-direct` has been moved onto low-level CTAP2 with hidraw auto-detection; it still accepts `--direct-device-path`, but no longer breaks if the card re-enumerates onto `/dev/hidraw1`
+  - after repeated fixes for hidraw lifetime, VM-side `python-fido2` response mapping, and CTAP payload shape, real app registration now succeeds for `directtest`
+
 ## Phase 5.5: Implement Dummy Resource + Access Policy on `k_server`

 1. Protected dummy resource.
@ -164,6 +277,14 @@ Exit criteria:
 - Authorized requests obtain consistent increasing values.
 - Unauthorized requests are rejected.

+Status (2026-04-25):
+- The protected counter resource is implemented and validated in the live split-VM chain.
+- Verified behavior:
+  - authorized requests from `k_proxy` obtain increasing values
+  - unauthorized post-logout requests from `k_client` are rejected with `401`
+  - `20` concurrent protected requests through the chain returned unique, gap-free values
+- Phase 5.5 is complete for the current prototype shape.
+
 ## Phase 6: Integrate Client Enrollment + Proxy Login Flow

 1. Enrollment process in `k_client`.
@ -176,11 +297,107 @@ Exit criteria:

 3. Browser flow in `k_client`.
 - Browser traffic goes only to `k_proxy`.
- Validate end-to-end login to `k_server` resource through proxy chain.
+
+Immediate next action:
+- Preserve the now-working direct auth path as a tested option while keeping the default deployed baseline stable.
+- Verified end-to-end state:
+  - direct `/enroll/register` succeeds for `directtest`
+  - direct `/session/login` succeeds for `directtest`
+  - `/session/status` succeeds
+  - protected `/resource/counter` succeeds through `k_proxy -> k_server`
+  - `/session/logout` succeeds
+  - post-logout protected access returns `401`
+- Next work should be cleanup/hardening:
+  - decide whether to keep `directtest` enrollment
+  - rerun `phase5_chain_regression.sh --interactive-card --expect-auth-mode fido2_assertion` against the current direct-auth baseline
+  - decide when `fido2-direct` should replace `probe` as the default deployed auth mode

 Exit criteria:
 - Enrollment and login both function end-to-end via `k_client -> k_proxy -> k_server`.

+Status (2026-04-25):
+- Added first `k_client` implementation at `/home/user/chromecard/k_client_portal.py`.
+- Current prototype flow:
+  - browser now targets `k_proxy` directly over `https://127.0.0.1:9771`
+  - `k_client_portal.py` also serves a local browser flow page on `http://127.0.0.1:8766`
+  - `k_proxy` continues to authenticate with the card and forward to `k_server`
+  - the `k_client` page now also lists registered users from `k_proxy`
+  - the `k_client` page can unregister users from the browser
+  - the portal login action now uses the current username field instead of only the remembered local user
+  - a Playwright regression spec now exists for the browser flow in `tests/k_client_portal.spec.js`
+  - the Playwright browser regression has now passed end-to-end once from this host against a forwarded portal URL
+- Verified end-to-end through the portal:
+  - enroll `alice`
+  - login succeeds
+  - session status succeeds
+  - protected counter succeeds repeatedly with session reuse
+  - logout succeeds
+- Enrollment contract progress:
+  - `k_proxy` now exposes prototype enrollment endpoints
+  - proxy-side enrollment storage exists and is checked before login is allowed
+  - direct browser/API traffic can now use those proxy endpoints without going through the local bridge
+- Phase 6 is materially further along for the current prototype shape:
+  - direct browser target is on `k_proxy`
+  - login/resource flow is integrated on the direct proxy path
+  - enrollment now has a real client->proxy path
+  - the `k_client` page is now a usable demo/operator surface in addition to the direct proxy path
+  - final enrollment semantics are still provisional
+
+Status (2026-04-25, enrollment hardening):
+- Added a more explicit provisional enrollment contract in `k_proxy`:
+  - username normalization and validation
+  - optional `display_name`
+  - separate create, update, delete, status, and list operations
+  - delete invalidates existing sessions for that username
+- Verified the hardened behaviors on the direct proxy path.
+- Phase 6 is now strong enough to treat the browser/proxy flow as a stable prototype baseline.
+- The remaining reason Phase 6 is not "final" is product semantics, not missing basic mechanics:
+  - whether enrollment should require card presence
+  - what user attributes belong in enrollment
+  - what re-enroll and recovery should mean
+
+Status (2026-04-25, Phase 6.5 initial concurrency results):
+- Added reproducible probe script at `/home/user/chromecard/phase65_concurrency_probe.py`.
+- Probe now supports `--max-workers` so client-side fan-out can be tested separately from total request count.
+- Moderate direct-path concurrency passes:
+  - `3 users x 4 requests`
+  - `12/12` successful protected calls
+  - counter values remained unique and contiguous
+- Larger direct-path concurrency currently fails:
+  - `5 users x 5 requests`
+  - only `18/25` successful protected calls
+  - failed calls report TLS EOF / upstream unavailable errors
+- Follow-up findings are more precise:
+  - body-drain handling was fixed for the HTTP/1.1 keep-alive experiment
+  - `k_proxy -> k_server` upstream concurrency is now clampable and currently tested at one pooled connection
+  - `5 users x 5 requests` passes at `25/25` when client fan-out is limited to `--max-workers 10`
+  - the same total load still fails at higher fan-out:
+    - `22/25` at `--max-workers 15`
+    - `15/25` at fully unbounded `25` workers in the latest rerun
+- Current bottleneck is still not counter correctness:
+  - successful results still show unique, contiguous counter values
+  - `k_proxy` and `k_server` complete the requests that actually arrive
+- Current likely bottleneck is the client-facing Qubes forwarding layer:
+  - `qvm_connect_9771.log` shows qrexec data-vchan failures
+  - observed message includes `xs_transaction_start: No space left on device`
+  - `qvm_connect_9780.log` showed earlier failures too, but the latest threshold test points first to connection fan-out on `k_client -> k_proxy`
+- Phase 6.5 is therefore started but not complete:
+  - application-level concurrency looks acceptable at moderate load
+  - current working envelope is roughly `10` in-flight protected calls on the direct browser path
+  - higher-load failures still need Qubes forwarding diagnosis before the phase can be closed
+
+Status (2026-04-25, Phase 5 regression helper):
+- Added repeatable split-VM regression helper:
+  - `/home/user/chromecard/phase5_chain_regression.sh`
+- Verified helper result on the live chain:
+  - `20` requests at parallelism `8`
+  - login/session-status/counter/logout sequence completed successfully
+  - returned counter values were unique and gap-free
+  - latest verified helper range was `43..62`
+- Current implication:
+  - the Phase 5 baseline is now reproducible
+  - next work should target auth semantics rather than basic chain bring-up
+
 ## Phase 6.5: Concurrency and Multi-Client Test Setup

 1. Single-VM concurrency tests.
@ -234,6 +451,79 @@ Exit criteria:
 - Re-scan relevant `.md` files before each new execution cycle and reconcile drift.
 - Record date-stamped session notes when priorities or blockers change.

+Status (2026-04-24, markdown maintenance):
+- Re-scanned the active workspace Markdown set and the main source-tree reference docs.
+- No workplan phase change was required from this pass.
+- Ongoing documentation watch item remains path drift in `CR_SDK_CK-main/README_HOST.md`, which still uses historical `./scripts/...` helper locations instead of workspace-root helper paths.
+- Operational note: the markdown scan path now runs cleanly after policy adjustment when invoked without a login shell.
+
+Status (2026-04-24, chain probe retry):
+- Phase 1 remains blocked, but the failure point is now narrowed further:
+  - current refusal occurs at Qubes `qubes.ConnectTCP` policy/service evaluation for ports `22`, `8770`, and `8780`
+  - this happens before any end-to-end app-level request can be retried
+- Practical implication:
+  - do not spend time on `k_proxy_app.py` / `k_server_app.py` request handling until qrexec forwarding is permitting the intended hops again
+  - next recovery action is to fix/activate the relevant Qubes `qubes.ConnectTCP` policy and then re-run the qrexec bridge checks before testing HTTP flow
+
+Status (2026-04-25, post-restart probe):
+- Corrected the client-facing proxy port reference to `8771`.
+- SSH access to `k_proxy` and card visibility recovered after VM restart.
+- New immediate blockers are:
+  - `k_proxy` service not listening on `127.0.0.1:8771`
+  - `k_server` service not listening on `127.0.0.1:8780`
+  - qrexec forwarding for `8771` and `8780` still returns `Request refused`
+- Next retry should start services first, then re-test qrexec forwarding and only then attempt end-to-end client flow.
+
+Status (2026-04-25, service restart):
+- Local VM services are running again on the intended loopback ports:
+  - `k_server`: `127.0.0.1:8780`
+  - `k_proxy`: `127.0.0.1:8771`
+- Phase 1 remains blocked specifically by qrexec policy/forwarding refusal on those ports.
+- Next action is no longer app startup; it is fixing the `qubes.ConnectTCP` allow path for `8771` and `8780`.
+
+Status (2026-04-25, in-VM forwarding test):
+- Verified that using `qvm-connect-tcp` inside the source VMs still does not complete the client->proxy hop:
+  - bind succeeds locally, but first real connection gets `Request refused`
+- Independent app-layer blocker also found in `k_proxy`:
+  - `python-fido2` is missing there, so local `/session/login` currently fails before card auth can succeed
+- Current ordered blockers:
+  - first: effective Qubes/qrexec allow path for `k_client -> k_proxy:8771`
+  - second: install `python-fido2` in `k_proxy`
+  - third: re-test end-to-end login and then proxy->server counter flow
+
+Status (2026-04-25, after python3-fido2 install):
+- `python3-fido2` blocker in `k_proxy` is resolved.
+- Updated ordered blockers:
+  - first: effective Qubes/qrexec allow path for `k_client -> k_proxy:8771`
+  - second: restore CTAP HID device visibility/access in `k_proxy` (`No CTAP HID devices found`)
+  - third: re-test end-to-end login and then proxy->server counter flow
+
+Status (2026-04-25, card reattached):
+- CTAP HID visibility/access in `k_proxy` is restored.
+- Local proxy login is working again with the attached card.
+- The only currently confirmed blocker for the end-to-end path is the `k_client -> k_proxy:8771` qrexec/`qvm-connect-tcp` refusal.
+
+Status (2026-04-25, clean forward retest):
+- The retest shows the same qrexec failure mode on both hops, not just the client-facing one.
+- Updated blocker statement:
+  - effective `qubes.ConnectTCP` allow path is failing for both
+    - `k_client -> k_proxy:8771`
+    - `k_proxy -> k_server:8780`
+- App services and card path are currently good; forwarding remains the single active system blocker.
+
+Status (2026-04-25, dom0 policy fix validated):
+- The explicit-destination dom0 `qubes.ConnectTCP` policy fix resolved forwarding on both hops.
+- Current verified working chain:
+  - `k_client -> k_proxy:8771`
+  - `k_proxy -> k_server:8780`
+- Current verified prototype behavior:
+  - session login works from `k_client`
+  - session status works
+  - protected counter flow reaches `k_server`
+  - session reuse avoids re-login for repeated counter calls
+  - logout invalidates the session and subsequent protected access returns `401`
+- Immediate networking blocker is cleared.
+
 Exit criteria:
 - New team member can follow docs end-to-end without path or tooling ambiguity.

@ -257,6 +547,31 @@ Exit criteria:
 Exit criteria:
 - `k_proxy` can validate via wireless phone path with no client-facing API changes.

+## Current Next Step
+
+Status (2026-04-27):
+- fido2-direct mode confirmed working end-to-end with real card via browser on k_client.
+- Full register → login → counter → logout flow verified with physical card button presses.
+- Bug fixed: ClientState.enroll() now calls /session/logout on k_proxy before re-enrolling.
+- 100-test unit suite added for k_proxy (tests/test_k_proxy.py); runs locally without card or VMs.
+- All three service files refactored and re-deployed.
+
+Phase status (2026-04-27):
+- Phase 6.5 (concurrency): deferred. Ceiling (~10 in-flight) is acceptable until multi-card use cases arrive.
+- Phase 7 (firmware build/flash): blocked on Chrome Roads (card vendor). No local action until that discussion concludes.
+- Phase 9 (phone integration): awaiting go-ahead. When approved: Flutter app (iOS + Android) replaces k_proxy; FIDO2 over WiFi to card; depends on Phase 7 firmware capability.
+
+No active engineering work is unblocked at this time. Resume when Chrome Roads responds or Phase 9 is approved.
+
+Status (2026-04-26, markdown maintenance):
+- Re-scanned `Setup.md`, `Workplan.md`, and `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md` against the current workspace files.
+- Updated the plan to match the verified state:
+  - direct FIDO2 auth is no longer the primary blocker because register/login/logout already work in the experimental path
+  - the main open system limit is concurrency/fan-out on the Qubes-forwarded browser path
+  - the current planning split is now:
+    - baseline path: keep `probe` mode stable and reproducible
+    - follow-up path: decide whether to promote `fido2-direct`
+
 ## Inputs Expected During This Session

 - Exact observed behavior on reconnect attempts (USB/hidraw/probe).
@ -267,3 +582,14 @@ Exit criteria:
 - Decision on where user/session authority lives (`k_proxy` vs `k_server` vs split).
 - Target concurrency level for validation (parallel clients and parallel requests per client).
 - Preferred wireless transport/protocol between `k_proxy` and phone (for future phase).
+
+## Session Maintenance Notes (2026-04-24)
+
+- Top-level Markdown review completed for `PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`, `Setup.md`, and `Workplan.md`.
+- Current execution plan remains in sync with the Phase 5 runbook:
+  - prototype services at `/home/user/chromecard/k_proxy_app.py` and `/home/user/chromecard/k_server_app.py`
+  - run sequence documented in `/home/user/chromecard/PHASE5_RUNBOOK.md`
+- No phase ordering or blocker changes were required from this review pass.
+- Remote execution support is now active and validated:
+  - `ssh` command execution works for `k_client`, `k_proxy`, `k_server`
+  - `scp` push to VM home works (validated on `k_proxy`)
--- a/ctaphid_init_probe.py
+++ b/ctaphid_init_probe.py
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Manual CTAPHID INIT probe for a specific hidraw node.
+
+This bypasses python-fido2's device bootstrap so we can see whether the raw HID
+transport itself exchanges packets on the expected FIDO interface.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import os
+import secrets
+import select
+import struct
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+CTAPHID_INIT = 0x06
+TYPE_INIT = 0x80
+BROADCAST_CID = 0xFFFFFFFF
+
+
+def build_init_packet(nonce: bytes) -> bytes:
+    frame = struct.pack(">IBH", BROADCAST_CID, TYPE_INIT | CTAPHID_INIT, len(nonce)) + nonce
+    return b"\0" + frame.ljust(64, b"\0")
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Manual CTAPHID INIT probe")
+    parser.add_argument("--device-path", default="/dev/hidraw0")
+    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=3.0)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    path = Path(args.device_path)
+    if not path.exists():
+        print(f"missing device: {path}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+
+    nonce = secrets.token_bytes(8)
+    packet = build_init_packet(nonce)
+    print(f"device={path}")
+    print(f"nonce={nonce.hex()}")
+    print(f"write_len={len(packet)}")
+    print(f"write_hex={packet.hex()}")
+
+    fd = os.open(str(path), os.O_RDWR)
+    try:
+        written = os.write(fd, packet)
+        print(f"written={written}")
+        poller = select.poll()
+        poller.register(fd, select.POLLIN)
+        events = poller.poll(int(args.timeout * 1000))
+        print(f"events={events}")
+        if not events:
+            print("timeout_waiting_for_response")
+            return 1
+        response = os.read(fd, 64)
+        print(f"read_len={len(response)}")
+        print(f"read_hex={response.hex()}")
+        if len(response) >= 24:
+            cid, cmd, bc = struct.unpack(">IBH", response[:7])
+            print(f"resp_cid=0x{cid:08x}")
+            print(f"resp_cmd=0x{cmd:02x}")
+            print(f"resp_bc={bc}")
+            print(f"resp_payload={response[7:7+bc].hex()}")
+        return 0
+    finally:
+        os.close(fd)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/generate_phase2_certs.py
+++ b/generate_phase2_certs.py
@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Generate a small local CA plus leaf certificates for Phase 2 HTTPS testing.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import ipaddress
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from cryptography import x509
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOID
+
+
+def build_name(common_name: str) -> x509.Name:
+    return x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])
+
+
+def new_private_key() -> rsa.RSAPrivateKey:
+    return rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
+
+
+def write_private_key(path: Path, key: rsa.RSAPrivateKey) -> None:
+    path.write_bytes(
+        key.private_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+            format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
+            encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption(),
+        )
+    )
+
+
+def write_cert(path: Path, cert: x509.Certificate) -> None:
+    path.write_bytes(cert.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM))
+
+
+def parse_sans(names: list[str]) -> list[x509.GeneralName]:
+    sans: list[x509.GeneralName] = []
+    seen = set()
+    for value in names:
+        if value in seen:
+            continue
+        seen.add(value)
+        try:
+            sans.append(x509.IPAddress(ipaddress.ip_address(value)))
+        except ValueError:
+            sans.append(x509.DNSName(value))
+    return sans
+
+
+def issue_ca(common_name: str, valid_days: int) -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, x509.Certificate]:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    key = new_private_key()
+    subject = issuer = build_name(common_name)
+    cert = (
+        x509.CertificateBuilder()
+        .subject_name(subject)
+        .issuer_name(issuer)
+        .public_key(key.public_key())
+        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
+        .not_valid_before(now - timedelta(minutes=5))
+        .not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=valid_days))
+        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), critical=True)
+        .add_extension(x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(key.public_key()), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(key.public_key()), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.KeyUsage(digital_signature=True, key_encipherment=False, key_cert_sign=True, crl_sign=True, content_commitment=False, data_encipherment=False, key_agreement=False, encipher_only=False, decipher_only=False), critical=True)
+        .sign(key, hashes.SHA256())
+    )
+    return key, cert
+
+
+def issue_leaf(
+    ca_key: rsa.RSAPrivateKey,
+    ca_cert: x509.Certificate,
+    common_name: str,
+    san_values: list[str],
+    valid_days: int,
+) -> tuple[rsa.RSAPrivateKey, x509.Certificate]:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    key = new_private_key()
+    cert = (
+        x509.CertificateBuilder()
+        .subject_name(build_name(common_name))
+        .issuer_name(ca_cert.subject)
+        .public_key(key.public_key())
+        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
+        .not_valid_before(now - timedelta(minutes=5))
+        .not_valid_after(now + timedelta(days=valid_days))
+        .add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), critical=True)
+        .add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName(parse_sans(san_values)), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(key.public_key()), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(ca_key.public_key()), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), critical=False)
+        .add_extension(x509.KeyUsage(digital_signature=True, key_encipherment=True, key_cert_sign=False, crl_sign=False, content_commitment=False, data_encipherment=False, key_agreement=False, encipher_only=False, decipher_only=False), critical=True)
+        .sign(ca_key, hashes.SHA256())
+    )
+    return key, cert
+
+
+def emit_leaf_bundle(
+    out_dir: Path,
+    leaf_name: str,
+    ca_key: rsa.RSAPrivateKey,
+    ca_cert: x509.Certificate,
+    san_values: list[str],
+    valid_days: int,
+) -> None:
+    key, cert = issue_leaf(ca_key, ca_cert, leaf_name, san_values, valid_days)
+    write_private_key(out_dir / f"{leaf_name}.key", key)
+    write_cert(out_dir / f"{leaf_name}.crt", cert)
+
+
+def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Generate local CA and Phase 2 service certificates")
+    parser.add_argument("--out-dir", default="tls/phase2")
+    parser.add_argument("--valid-days", type=int, default=30)
+    parser.add_argument("--ca-common-name", default="ChromeCard Phase2 Local CA")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--proxy-san",
+        action="append",
+        default=[],
+        help="Extra SAN for k_proxy certificate; may be repeated",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--server-san",
+        action="append",
+        default=[],
+        help="Extra SAN for k_server certificate; may be repeated",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parse_args()
+    out_dir = Path(args.out_dir)
+    out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    ca_key, ca_cert = issue_ca(args.ca_common_name, args.valid_days)
+    write_private_key(out_dir / "ca.key", ca_key)
+    write_cert(out_dir / "ca.crt", ca_cert)
+
+    proxy_sans = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "k_proxy", *args.proxy_san]
+    server_sans = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "k_server", *args.server_san]
+
+    emit_leaf_bundle(out_dir, "k_proxy", ca_key, ca_cert, proxy_sans, args.valid_days)
+    emit_leaf_bundle(out_dir, "k_server", ca_key, ca_cert, server_sans, args.valid_days)
+
+    print(f"Generated CA and leaf certificates in {out_dir}")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/k_client_portal.py
+++ b/k_client_portal.py
@ -0,0 +1,850 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+k_client_portal — browser-facing portal running in k_client.
+
+Serves the single-page UI and thin API shim that delegates every auth and
+resource operation to k_proxy over the localhost-forwarded TLS endpoint.
+Persists one preferred username locally; all session and enrollment state
+lives in k_proxy.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import ssl
+import threading
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+
+HTML = """<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+  <title>ChromeCard Client Flow</title>
+  <style>
+    :root {
+      --bg: #f3efe8;
+      --panel: #fffdf8;
+      --ink: #181614;
+      --muted: #655f56;
+      --line: #d9cfbf;
+      --accent: #0c6a60;
+      --accent-2: #8a5b2b;
+      --ok: #17653c;
+      --warn: #8f5b00;
+      --bad: #8a1f28;
+      --shadow: rgba(55, 41, 19, 0.08);
+    }
+    * { box-sizing: border-box; }
+    body {
+      margin: 0;
+      font-family: "Iowan Old Style", "Palatino Linotype", serif;
+      background:
+        radial-gradient(circle at top left, rgba(12,106,96,0.12), transparent 34%),
+        linear-gradient(180deg, #f9f3e8 0%, var(--bg) 100%);
+      color: var(--ink);
+    }
+    main {
+      max-width: 980px;
+      margin: 0 auto;
+      padding: 32px 20px 56px;
+    }
+    .hero, .panel {
+      padding: 22px 24px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: linear-gradient(135deg, rgba(255,253,248,0.98), rgba(242,237,228,0.94));
+      box-shadow: 0 18px 40px var(--shadow);
+    }
+    .hero {
+      margin-bottom: 18px;
+    }
+    h1 {
+      margin: 0 0 8px;
+      font-size: clamp(2rem, 4vw, 3.4rem);
+      line-height: 0.95;
+      letter-spacing: -0.04em;
+    }
+    .subtitle {
+      margin: 0;
+      color: var(--muted);
+      max-width: 62ch;
+      font-size: 1rem;
+    }
+    .grid {
+      display: grid;
+      grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1.3fr) minmax(300px, 0.9fr);
+      gap: 18px;
+      align-items: start;
+    }
+    .stack {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 18px;
+    }
+    .actions, .row {
+      display: flex;
+      flex-wrap: wrap;
+      gap: 10px;
+    }
+    .actions {
+      margin-top: 18px;
+    }
+    input {
+      width: 100%;
+      padding: 10px 12px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: #fff;
+      font: inherit;
+      color: var(--ink);
+    }
+    label {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 6px;
+      margin-top: 14px;
+      color: var(--muted);
+      font-size: 0.95rem;
+    }
+    button {
+      text-decoration: none;
+      border: 0;
+      padding: 10px 14px;
+      font: inherit;
+      color: #fff;
+      background: var(--accent);
+      cursor: pointer;
+    }
+    button.secondary { background: var(--accent-2); }
+    button.ghost {
+      background: #fff;
+      color: var(--ink);
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+    }
+    button:disabled {
+      opacity: 0.55;
+      cursor: wait;
+    }
+    .status {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 12px;
+    }
+    .status-card {
+      padding: 14px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: rgba(255,255,255,0.86);
+    }
+    .status-card h2 {
+      margin: 0 0 6px;
+      font-size: 1rem;
+    }
+    .status-line {
+      font-size: 0.95rem;
+      color: var(--muted);
+    }
+    #usersList {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 8px;
+      margin-top: 12px;
+    }
+    .user-row {
+      display: flex;
+      flex-wrap: wrap;
+      justify-content: space-between;
+      align-items: center;
+      gap: 10px;
+      padding: 10px 12px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: rgba(255,255,255,0.86);
+    }
+    .user-meta {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 2px;
+    }
+    .user-name {
+      font-weight: 600;
+    }
+    .user-subtle {
+      color: var(--muted);
+      font-size: 0.9rem;
+    }
+    .user-actions {
+      display: flex;
+      flex-wrap: wrap;
+      gap: 8px;
+    }
+    .small {
+      padding: 8px 10px;
+      font-size: 0.92rem;
+    }
+    .badge {
+      display: inline-block;
+      padding: 4px 8px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      font-size: 0.86rem;
+      background: #fff;
+      color: var(--ink);
+      margin-right: 6px;
+      margin-bottom: 6px;
+    }
+    .timeline {
+      display: grid;
+      gap: 10px;
+      margin-top: 16px;
+    }
+    .step {
+      display: grid;
+      grid-template-columns: 32px 1fr;
+      gap: 12px;
+      padding: 12px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: rgba(255,255,255,0.84);
+    }
+    .step-index {
+      width: 32px;
+      height: 32px;
+      display: grid;
+      place-items: center;
+      border-radius: 999px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: #fff;
+      font-size: 0.88rem;
+    }
+    .hint {
+      margin-top: 14px;
+      padding: 12px 14px;
+      border-left: 4px solid var(--accent-2);
+      background: rgba(138,91,43,0.08);
+      color: var(--ink);
+      font-size: 0.95rem;
+    }
+    pre {
+      margin: 0;
+      padding: 16px;
+      overflow: auto;
+      border: 1px solid var(--line);
+      background: #16130f;
+      color: #efe7da;
+      font-family: "SFMono-Regular", Consolas, monospace;
+      font-size: 0.9rem;
+      line-height: 1.45;
+      min-height: 360px;
+    }
+    @media (max-width: 860px) {
+      .grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; }
+    }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <main>
+    <section class="hero">
+      <h1>ChromeCard Client Flow</h1>
+      <p class="subtitle">
+        This page runs in `k_client` and drives the real split-VM flow:
+        register a user, ask the card in `k_proxy` for approval, and then call
+        the protected counter on `k_server` only if auth succeeds.
+      </p>
+    </section>
+
+    <div class="grid">
+      <section class="stack">
+        <section class="panel">
+          <div class="row">
+            <span class="badge">Browser: k_client</span>
+            <span class="badge">Card: k_proxy</span>
+            <span class="badge">Resource: k_server</span>
+          </div>
+
+          <label>
+            Username
+            <input id="username" value="directtest" autocomplete="off">
+          </label>
+
+          <div class="actions">
+            <button id="registerBtn">Register User</button>
+            <button id="loginBtn">Login</button>
+            <button id="counterBtn">Call k_server</button>
+            <button id="logoutBtn" class="secondary">Logout</button>
+            <button id="runFlowBtn" class="ghost">Run Full Flow</button>
+            <button id="refreshBtn" class="ghost">Refresh State</button>
+          </div>
+
+          <div class="hint" id="hintBox">
+            Registration: press <strong>yes</strong> on the card to enroll.
+            Login: press <strong>yes</strong> to allow the identity check, or
+            <strong>no</strong> to deny it. If login is denied, this page will
+            show that `k_server` was not called.
+          </div>
+
+          <div class="timeline">
+            <div class="step">
+              <div class="step-index">1</div>
+              <div>
+                <strong>Register user</strong><br>
+                Creates or refreshes the enrolled identity in `k_proxy`.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+            <div class="step">
+              <div class="step-index">2</div>
+              <div>
+                <strong>Authenticate with the card</strong><br>
+                `k_proxy` asks the card for approval. Press `yes` to continue or `no` to reject.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+            <div class="step">
+              <div class="step-index">3</div>
+              <div>
+                <strong>Call `k_server`</strong><br>
+                The protected counter is only reached when login created a valid session.
+              </div>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+        </section>
+
+        <section class="panel status">
+          <div class="status-card">
+            <h2>Client State</h2>
+            <div class="status-line" id="stateUser">Enrolled user: unknown</div>
+            <div class="status-line" id="stateSession">Session: unknown</div>
+            <div class="status-line" id="stateExpires">Expires: unknown</div>
+          </div>
+          <div class="status-card">
+            <h2>Registered Users</h2>
+            <div class="status-line" id="usersSummary">Loading users...</div>
+            <div id="usersList"></div>
+          </div>
+          <div class="status-card">
+            <h2>Flow Result</h2>
+            <div class="status-line" id="flowResult">No flow run yet.</div>
+          </div>
+        </section>
+      </section>
+
+      <section class="panel">
+        <h2 style="margin-top:0">Event Log</h2>
+        <pre id="log"></pre>
+      </section>
+    </div>
+  </main>
+
+  <script>
+    const logNode = document.getElementById("log");
+    const hintBox = document.getElementById("hintBox");
+    const flowResult = document.getElementById("flowResult");
+    const stateUser = document.getElementById("stateUser");
+    const stateSession = document.getElementById("stateSession");
+    const stateExpires = document.getElementById("stateExpires");
+    const usersSummary = document.getElementById("usersSummary");
+    const usersList = document.getElementById("usersList");
+    const usernameInput = document.getElementById("username");
+    const buttons = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll("button"));
+
+    function log(message, payload) {
+      const stamp = new Date().toLocaleTimeString();
+      let line = `[${stamp}] ${message}`;
+      if (payload !== undefined) {
+        line += "\\n" + JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2);
+      }
+      logNode.textContent = line + "\\n\\n" + logNode.textContent;
+    }
+
+    function setBusy(busy) {
+      for (const button of buttons) button.disabled = busy;
+    }
+
+    function username() {
+      return usernameInput.value.trim();
+    }
+
+    async function api(path, payload) {
+      const resp = await fetch(path, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        body: JSON.stringify(payload || {})
+      });
+      const data = await resp.json();
+      return {status: resp.status, data};
+    }
+
+    async function refreshState() {
+      const resp = await fetch("/api/client/state");
+      const data = await resp.json();
+      stateUser.textContent = `Enrolled user: ${data.enrolled_username || "none"}`;
+      stateSession.textContent = `Session active: ${data.session_active ? "yes" : "no"}`;
+      stateExpires.textContent = `Expires: ${data.session_expires_at || "none"}`;
+      return data;
+    }
+
+    function renderUsers(users) {
+      usersList.innerHTML = "";
+      if (!users.length) {
+        usersSummary.textContent = "No registered users in k_proxy.";
+        return;
+      }
+      usersSummary.textContent = `${users.length} registered user${users.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} visible in k_proxy.`;
+      for (const user of users) {
+        const row = document.createElement("div");
+        row.className = "user-row";
+
+        const meta = document.createElement("div");
+        meta.className = "user-meta";
+        meta.innerHTML =
+          `<div class="user-name">${user.username}</div>` +
+          `<div class="user-subtle">Credential present: ${user.has_credential ? "yes" : "no"}</div>`;
+
+        const actions = document.createElement("div");
+        actions.className = "user-actions";
+
+        const useBtn = document.createElement("button");
+        useBtn.className = "ghost small";
+        useBtn.textContent = "Use";
+        useBtn.addEventListener("click", () => {
+          usernameInput.value = user.username;
+          flowResult.textContent = `Selected user ${user.username}.`;
+        });
+
+        const deleteBtn = document.createElement("button");
+        deleteBtn.className = "secondary small";
+        deleteBtn.textContent = "Unregister";
+        deleteBtn.addEventListener("click", async () => {
+          setBusy(true);
+          try { await deleteUser(user.username); } finally { setBusy(false); }
+        });
+
+        actions.appendChild(useBtn);
+        actions.appendChild(deleteBtn);
+        row.appendChild(meta);
+        row.appendChild(actions);
+        usersList.appendChild(row);
+      }
+    }
+
+    async function refreshUsers() {
+      const resp = await fetch("/api/enrollments");
+      const data = await resp.json();
+      renderUsers(data.users || []);
+      return data;
+    }
+
+    async function registerUser() {
+      hintBox.innerHTML = "Card step: if the card shows a <strong>registration</strong> prompt, press <strong>yes</strong> to enroll this user.";
+      const result = await api("/api/enroll", {username: username()});
+      log("Register user", result);
+      flowResult.textContent = result.status === 200 ? "User registration succeeded." : "User registration failed.";
+      await refreshState();
+      await refreshUsers();
+      return result;
+    }
+
+    async function loginUser() {
+      hintBox.innerHTML = "Card step: if the card shows an <strong>authentication</strong> prompt, press <strong>yes</strong> to allow login or <strong>no</strong> to deny it.";
+      const result = await api("/api/login", {username: username()});
+      log("Login", result);
+      await refreshState();
+      return result;
+    }
+
+    async function callCounter() {
+      const result = await api("/api/resource/counter", {});
+      log("Call k_server counter", result);
+      flowResult.textContent =
+        result.status === 200
+          ? `k_server was reached. Counter value: ${result.data.upstream?.value}`
+          : "k_server was not reached successfully.";
+      return result;
+    }
+
+    async function logoutUser() {
+      const result = await api("/api/logout", {});
+      log("Logout", result);
+      flowResult.textContent = result.status === 200 ? "Session cleared." : "Logout failed.";
+      await refreshState();
+      return result;
+    }
+
+    async function deleteUser(usernameToDelete) {
+      const result = await api("/api/enroll/delete", {username: usernameToDelete});
+      log("Unregister user", result);
+      flowResult.textContent =
+        result.status === 200
+          ? `User ${usernameToDelete} was unregistered.`
+          : `Could not unregister ${usernameToDelete}.`;
+      if (result.status === 200 && username() === usernameToDelete) {
+        usernameInput.value = "";
+      }
+      await refreshState();
+      await refreshUsers();
+      return result;
+    }
+
+    async function runFlow() {
+      setBusy(true);
+      flowResult.textContent = "Flow running...";
+      try {
+        const login = await loginUser();
+        if (login.status !== 200) {
+          flowResult.textContent = "Login denied or failed. `k_server` was not called.";
+          log("Flow stopped before k_server", {
+            reason: "login failed",
+            status: login.status,
+            response: login.data
+          });
+          return;
+        }
+        const counter = await callCounter();
+        if (counter.status === 200) {
+          flowResult.textContent = `Flow succeeded. k_server returned counter ${counter.data.upstream?.value}.`;
+        } else {
+          flowResult.textContent = "Login succeeded, but the protected k_server call failed.";
+        }
+      } finally {
+        setBusy(false);
+      }
+    }
+
+    document.getElementById("registerBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+      setBusy(true);
+      try { await registerUser(); } finally { setBusy(false); }
+    });
+    document.getElementById("loginBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+      setBusy(true);
+      try {
+        const result = await loginUser();
+        flowResult.textContent = result.status === 200 ? "Login succeeded. You can now call k_server." : "Login denied or failed. k_server was not called.";
+      } finally { setBusy(false); }
+    });
+    document.getElementById("counterBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+      setBusy(true);
+      try { await callCounter(); } finally { setBusy(false); }
+    });
+    document.getElementById("logoutBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+      setBusy(true);
+      try { await logoutUser(); } finally { setBusy(false); }
+    });
+    document.getElementById("runFlowBtn").addEventListener("click", runFlow);
+    document.getElementById("refreshBtn").addEventListener("click", async () => {
+      setBusy(true);
+      try {
+        const state = await refreshState();
+        const users = await refreshUsers();
+        log("State refreshed", {state, users});
+      } finally { setBusy(false); }
+    });
+
+    Promise.all([refreshState(), refreshUsers()]).then(([state, users]) => {
+      log("Client flow page ready", {state, users});
+    });
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
+"""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class EnrollmentRecord:
+    username: str
+
+
+class ClientState:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        proxy_base_url: str,
+        proxy_ca_file: str | None,
+        enroll_db: Path,
+        interactive_timeout_s: float = 90.0,
+        default_timeout_s: float = 10.0,
+    ):
+        self.proxy_base_url = proxy_base_url.rstrip("/")
+        self.proxy_ca_file = proxy_ca_file
+        self.enroll_db = enroll_db
+        # Registration and login both require a physical card touch, which can
+        # take up to ~60 s in practice; 90 s gives a generous margin.
+        self.interactive_timeout_s = interactive_timeout_s
+        self.default_timeout_s = default_timeout_s
+        self.lock = threading.Lock()
+        self.preferred_enrollment: EnrollmentRecord | None = None
+        self.session_token: str | None = None
+        self.session_expires_at: int | None = None
+        # Build the TLS context once; creating it on every request is expensive
+        # and the CA file doesn't change at runtime.
+        self._ssl_ctx: ssl.SSLContext | None = (
+            ssl.create_default_context(cafile=self.proxy_ca_file)
+            if proxy_base_url.startswith("https://")
+            else None
+        )
+        self._load_preferred_enrollment()
+
+    def _ssl_context(self) -> ssl.SSLContext | None:
+        return self._ssl_ctx
+
+    def _proxy_json(
+        self,
+        method: str,
+        path: str,
+        payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+        *,
+        timeout_s: float | None = None,
+    ) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        req = Request(f"{self.proxy_base_url}{path}", method=method)
+        req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        token = self.get_session_token()
+        if token:
+            req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
+        body = json.dumps(payload or {}).encode("utf-8")
+        try:
+            with urlopen(
+                req,
+                data=body,
+                timeout=timeout_s or self.default_timeout_s,
+                context=self._ssl_context(),
+            ) as resp:
+                return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except HTTPError as exc:
+            try:
+                return exc.code, json.loads(exc.read().decode("utf-8"))
+            except Exception:
+                return exc.code, {"ok": False, "error": f"proxy http error {exc.code}"}
+        except URLError as exc:
+            return 502, {"ok": False, "error": f"proxy unavailable: {exc.reason}"}
+        except Exception as exc:
+            return 502, {"ok": False, "error": f"proxy call failed: {exc}"}
+
+    def _load_preferred_enrollment(self) -> None:
+        if not self.enroll_db.exists():
+            return
+        try:
+            data = json.loads(self.enroll_db.read_text())
+            username = str(data.get("username", "")).strip()
+            if username:
+                self.preferred_enrollment = EnrollmentRecord(username=username)
+        except Exception:
+            self.preferred_enrollment = None
+
+    def _save_preferred_enrollment_locked(self) -> None:
+        self.enroll_db.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        payload = {"username": self.preferred_enrollment.username if self.preferred_enrollment else None}
+        self.enroll_db.write_text(json.dumps(payload, indent=2) + "\n")
+
+    def enroll(self, username: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        username = username.strip()
+        if not username:
+            return {"ok": False, "error": "username required"}
+        # Best-effort: invalidate any active session on k_proxy before re-enrolling.
+        # The new credential will differ from what the old session was issued for.
+        with self.lock:
+            old_token = self.session_token
+        if old_token:
+            self._proxy_json("POST", "/session/logout")
+        status, data = self._proxy_json(
+            "POST",
+            "/enroll/register",
+            {"username": username},
+            timeout_s=self.interactive_timeout_s,
+        )
+        if status != 200:
+            return data
+        with self.lock:
+            self.preferred_enrollment = EnrollmentRecord(username=username)
+            self._save_preferred_enrollment_locked()
+            self.session_token = None
+            self.session_expires_at = None
+        return {
+            "ok": True,
+            "enrolled_username": username,
+            "proxy_enrollment": data,
+        }
+
+    def list_enrollments(self) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._proxy_json("GET", "/enroll/list")
+
+    def delete_enrollment(self, username: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        username = username.strip()
+        if not username:
+            return 400, {"ok": False, "error": "username required"}
+        status, data = self._proxy_json("POST", "/enroll/delete", {"username": username})
+        if status == 200:
+            with self.lock:
+                if self.preferred_enrollment and self.preferred_enrollment.username == username:
+                    self.preferred_enrollment = None
+                    self._save_preferred_enrollment_locked()
+                self.session_token = None
+                self.session_expires_at = None
+        return status, data
+
+    def snapshot(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        with self.lock:
+            return {
+                "ok": True,
+                "enrolled_username": self.preferred_enrollment.username if self.preferred_enrollment else None,
+                "session_active": bool(self.session_token),
+                "session_expires_at": self.session_expires_at,
+                "proxy_base_url": self.proxy_base_url,
+            }
+
+    def get_session_token(self) -> str | None:
+        with self.lock:
+            return self.session_token
+
+    def login(self, username: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        requested = (username or "").strip()
+        with self.lock:
+            if requested:
+                username = requested
+            elif self.preferred_enrollment:
+                username = self.preferred_enrollment.username
+            else:
+                return 400, {"ok": False, "error": "no enrolled user"}
+
+        status, data = self._proxy_json(
+            "POST",
+            "/session/login",
+            {"username": username},
+            timeout_s=self.interactive_timeout_s,
+        )
+        if status == 200 and data.get("session_token"):
+            with self.lock:
+                self.preferred_enrollment = EnrollmentRecord(username=username)
+                self._save_preferred_enrollment_locked()
+                self.session_token = data["session_token"]
+                self.session_expires_at = int(data.get("expires_at", 0)) or None
+        return status, data
+
+    def status(self) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._proxy_json("POST", "/session/status")
+
+    def counter(self) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        return self._proxy_json("POST", "/resource/counter")
+
+    def logout(self) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+        status, data = self._proxy_json("POST", "/session/logout")
+        if status == 200:
+            with self.lock:
+                self.session_token = None
+                self.session_expires_at = None
+        return status, data
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    state: ClientState
+
+    def _json(self, status: int, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        body = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _html(self, body: str) -> None:
+        data = body.encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def _read_json(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        raw = self.rfile.read(length)
+        if not raw:
+            return {}
+        return json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _require_json(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        # Returns None and sends 400 when the body is unparseable; the caller
+        # should return immediately without sending a second response.
+        try:
+            return self._read_json()
+        except Exception:
+            self._json(400, {"ok": False, "error": "invalid json"})
+            return None
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path == "/":
+            self._html(HTML)
+            return
+        if path == "/health":
+            self._json(200, {"ok": True, "service": "k_client_portal", "time": int(time.time())})
+            return
+        if path == "/api/client/state":
+            self._json(200, self.state.snapshot())
+            return
+        if path == "/api/enrollments":
+            status, data = self.state.list_enrollments()
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        self.send_error(404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path == "/api/enroll":
+            data = self._require_json()
+            if data is None:
+                return
+            result = self.state.enroll(str(data.get("username", "")))
+            self._json(200 if result.get("ok") else 400, result)
+            return
+        if path == "/api/login":
+            data = self._require_json()
+            if data is None:
+                return
+            status, data = self.state.login(str(data.get("username", "")))
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        if path == "/api/enroll/delete":
+            data = self._require_json()
+            if data is None:
+                return
+            status, data = self.state.delete_enrollment(str(data.get("username", "")))
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        if path == "/api/status":
+            status, data = self.state.status()
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        if path == "/api/resource/counter":
+            status, data = self.state.counter()
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        if path == "/api/logout":
+            status, data = self.state.logout()
+            self._json(status, data)
+            return
+        self.send_error(404)
+
+
+def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run browser-facing client portal in k_client")
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8766)
+    parser.add_argument("--proxy-base-url", default="https://127.0.0.1:9771")
+    parser.add_argument("--proxy-ca-file", help="CA certificate used to verify k_proxy HTTPS certificate")
+    parser.add_argument("--enroll-db", default="/home/user/chromecard/k_client_enrollment.json")
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parse_args()
+    if args.proxy_base_url.startswith("https://") and not args.proxy_ca_file:
+        raise SystemExit("--proxy-ca-file is required when --proxy-base-url uses https")
+
+    Handler.state = ClientState(
+        proxy_base_url=args.proxy_base_url,
+        proxy_ca_file=args.proxy_ca_file,
+        enroll_db=Path(args.enroll_db),
+    )
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((args.host, args.port), Handler)
+    print(f"k_client_portal listening on http://{args.host}:{args.port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/k_proxy_app.py
+++ b/k_proxy_app.py
--- a/k_server_app.py
+++ b/k_server_app.py
@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+k_server — protected resource backend.
+
+Exposes a monotonic counter behind a shared proxy token. Only k_proxy
+is expected to reach this service; k_client should have no direct path.
+All state is process-local and resets on restart.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import ssl
+import threading
+import time
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+
+class ServerState:
+    # All state is process-local; a restart resets the counter to zero.
+    def __init__(self, proxy_token: str):
+        self.proxy_token = proxy_token
+        self.counter = 0
+        self.lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def next_counter(self) -> int:
+        with self.lock:
+            self.counter += 1
+            return self.counter
+
+
+class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    state: ServerState
+    protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
+
+    def _json(self, status: int, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        body = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(body)
+
+    def _discard_request_body(self) -> None:
+        # HTTP/1.1 keep-alive: the connection is reused, so the body must be fully
+        # consumed before we send the response, even for endpoints that ignore it.
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+        if length > 0:
+            self.rfile.read(length)
+
+    def _is_proxy_authorized(self) -> bool:
+        return self.headers.get("X-Proxy-Token") == self.state.proxy_token
+
+    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path == "/health":
+            self._json(
+                200,
+                {
+                    "ok": True,
+                    "service": "k_server",
+                    "time": int(time.time()),
+                },
+            )
+            return
+        self.send_error(404)
+
+    def do_POST(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
+        path = urlparse(self.path).path
+        if path != "/resource/counter":
+            self.send_error(404)
+            return
+        self._discard_request_body()
+        if not self._is_proxy_authorized():
+            self._json(401, {"ok": False, "error": "unauthorized proxy"})
+            return
+
+        value = self.state.next_counter()
+        self._json(
+            200,
+            {
+                "ok": True,
+                "resource": "counter",
+                "value": value,
+                "time": int(time.time()),
+            },
+        )
+
+
+def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run k_server counter service")
+    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1")
+    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8780)
+    parser.add_argument("--tls-certfile", help="PEM certificate chain for HTTPS listener")
+    parser.add_argument("--tls-keyfile", help="PEM private key for HTTPS listener")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--proxy-token",
+        default="dev-proxy-token",
+        help="Shared token expected in X-Proxy-Token from k_proxy",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parse_args()
+    if bool(args.tls_certfile) != bool(args.tls_keyfile):
+        raise SystemExit("Both --tls-certfile and --tls-keyfile are required to enable HTTPS")
+
+    state = ServerState(proxy_token=args.proxy_token)
+    Handler.state = state
+    server = ThreadingHTTPServer((args.host, args.port), Handler)
+    scheme = "http"
+    if args.tls_certfile:
+        context = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+        context.load_cert_chain(certfile=args.tls_certfile, keyfile=args.tls_keyfile)
+        server.socket = context.wrap_socket(server.socket, server_side=True)
+        scheme = "https"
+
+    print(f"k_server listening on {scheme}://{args.host}:{args.port}")
+    server.serve_forever()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/package-lock.json
+++ b/package-lock.json
@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+{
+  "name": "chromecard-browser-regression",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "lockfileVersion": 3,
+  "requires": true,
+  "packages": {
+    "": {
+      "name": "chromecard-browser-regression",
+      "version": "0.1.0",
+      "devDependencies": {
+        "@playwright/test": "^1.54.2"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@playwright/test": {
+      "version": "1.59.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@playwright/test/-/test-1.59.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-PG6q63nQg5c9rIi4/Z5lR5IVF7yU5MqmKaPOe0HSc0O2cX1fPi96sUQu5j7eo4gKCkB2AnNGoWt7y4/Xx3Kcqg==",
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "playwright": "1.59.1"
+      },
+      "bin": {
+        "playwright": "cli.js"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/fsevents": {
+      "version": "2.3.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fsevents/-/fsevents-2.3.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-xiqMQR4xAeHTuB9uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiyT7jsgVCq1bkVygt00oASowB7EdtpOHaaPgKt812P9ab+DDKA==",
+      "dev": true,
+      "hasInstallScript": true,
+      "license": "MIT",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "darwin"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": "^8.16.0 || ^10.6.0 || >=11.0.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/playwright": {
+      "version": "1.59.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/playwright/-/playwright-1.59.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-C8oWjPR3F81yljW9o5OxcWzfh6avkVwDD2VYdwIGqTkl+OGFISgypqzfu7dOe4QNLL2aqcWBmI3PMtLIK233lw==",
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "playwright-core": "1.59.1"
+      },
+      "bin": {
+        "playwright": "cli.js"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18"
+      },
+      "optionalDependencies": {
+        "fsevents": "2.3.2"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/playwright-core": {
+      "version": "1.59.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/playwright-core/-/playwright-core-1.59.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-HBV/RJg81z5BiiZ9yPzIiClYV/QMsDCKUyogwH9p3MCP6IYjUFu/MActgYAvK0oWyV9NlwM3GLBjADyWgydVyg==",
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "bin": {
+        "playwright-core": "cli.js"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=18"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "name": "chromecard-browser-regression",
+  "private": true,
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Playwright regression checks for the k_client browser flow",
+  "scripts": {
+    "test:k-client": "playwright test tests/k_client_portal.spec.js"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@playwright/test": "^1.54.2"
+  }
+}
--- a/phase5_chain_regression.sh
+++ b/phase5_chain_regression.sh
@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+CLIENT_HOST="${CLIENT_HOST:-k_client}"
+CA_FILE="${CA_FILE:-/home/user/chromecard/tls/phase2/ca.crt}"
+PROXY_URL="${PROXY_URL:-https://127.0.0.1:9771}"
+USERNAME="${USERNAME:-alice}"
+REQUESTS="${REQUESTS:-20}"
+PARALLELISM="${PARALLELISM:-8}"
+CONNECT_TIMEOUT="${CONNECT_TIMEOUT:-8}"
+LOGIN_TIMEOUT="${LOGIN_TIMEOUT:-90}"
+INTERACTIVE_CARD="${INTERACTIVE_CARD:-0}"
+EXPECT_AUTH_MODE="${EXPECT_AUTH_MODE:-}"
+SSH_CONFIG="${SSH_CONFIG:-/home/user/.ssh/config}"
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'EOF'
+Usage: phase5_chain_regression.sh [options]
+
+Runs the Phase 5 split-VM regression from the host by executing the client-side
+flow inside k_client over SSH.
+
+Options:
+  --client-host HOST       SSH host alias for k_client (default: k_client)
+  --ca-file PATH           CA bundle path inside k_client
+  --proxy-url URL          Proxy URL visible from k_client
+  --username NAME          Username for session login
+  --requests N             Number of counter requests to issue
+  --parallelism N          Number of concurrent workers
+  --connect-timeout SEC    SSH connect timeout
+  --login-timeout SEC      Timeout for the interactive login request (default: 90)
+  --interactive-card       Print card-confirmation instructions before login
+  --expect-auth-mode NAME  Require login response auth_mode to match
+  --ssh-config PATH        SSH config file to use (default: /home/user/.ssh/config)
+  -h, --help               Show this help text
+EOF
+}
+
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --client-host)
+      CLIENT_HOST="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --ca-file)
+      CA_FILE="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --proxy-url)
+      PROXY_URL="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --username)
+      USERNAME="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --requests)
+      REQUESTS="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --parallelism)
+      PARALLELISM="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --connect-timeout)
+      CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --login-timeout)
+      LOGIN_TIMEOUT="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --interactive-card)
+      INTERACTIVE_CARD=1
+      shift
+      ;;
+    --expect-auth-mode)
+      EXPECT_AUTH_MODE="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    --ssh-config)
+      SSH_CONFIG="$2"
+      shift 2
+      ;;
+    -h|--help)
+      usage
+      exit 0
+      ;;
+    *)
+      echo "unknown argument: $1" >&2
+      usage >&2
+      exit 2
+      ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if [[ "${INTERACTIVE_CARD}" == "1" ]]; then
+  cat <<EOF
+Starting interactive login for ${USERNAME}.
+When the card shows the authentication prompt, press yes to approve.
+Press no only if you want to reject the login.
+EOF
+fi
+
+ssh \
+  -F "${SSH_CONFIG}" \
+  -o BatchMode=yes \
+  -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
+  -o ConnectTimeout="${CONNECT_TIMEOUT}" \
+  "${CLIENT_HOST}" \
+  env \
+    CA_FILE="${CA_FILE}" \
+    PROXY_URL="${PROXY_URL}" \
+    USERNAME="${USERNAME}" \
+    REQUESTS="${REQUESTS}" \
+    PARALLELISM="${PARALLELISM}" \
+    LOGIN_TIMEOUT="${LOGIN_TIMEOUT}" \
+    EXPECT_AUTH_MODE="${EXPECT_AUTH_MODE}" \
+    python3 - <<'PY'
+import concurrent.futures
+import json
+import os
+import ssl
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+ca_file = os.environ["CA_FILE"]
+proxy_url = os.environ["PROXY_URL"].rstrip("/")
+username = os.environ["USERNAME"]
+requests = int(os.environ["REQUESTS"])
+parallelism = int(os.environ["PARALLELISM"])
+login_timeout = int(os.environ["LOGIN_TIMEOUT"])
+expect_auth_mode = os.environ["EXPECT_AUTH_MODE"]
+
+if requests < 1:
+    raise SystemExit("REQUESTS must be >= 1")
+if parallelism < 1:
+    raise SystemExit("PARALLELISM must be >= 1")
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=ca_file)
+
+def post_json(path: str, payload: dict | None = None, token: str | None = None, timeout: int = 10):
+    data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+    headers = {}
+    if payload is not None:
+        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
+    if token:
+        headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        f"{proxy_url}{path}",
+        data=data,
+        headers=headers,
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=timeout) as resp:
+            return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
+        body = exc.read().decode("utf-8")
+        try:
+            payload = json.loads(body)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError:
+            payload = {"ok": False, "error": body}
+        return exc.code, payload
+
+status, login = post_json("/session/login", {"username": username}, timeout=login_timeout)
+if status != 200 or "session_token" not in login:
+    print(json.dumps({"ok": False, "stage": "login", "status": status, "response": login}))
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+if expect_auth_mode and login.get("auth_mode") != expect_auth_mode:
+    print(
+        json.dumps(
+            {
+                "ok": False,
+                "stage": "login",
+                "error": "unexpected auth_mode",
+                "expected": expect_auth_mode,
+                "response": login,
+            }
+        )
+    )
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+
+token = login["session_token"]
+values = []
+
+def fetch_one(_: int) -> int:
+    status, payload = post_json("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RuntimeError(json.dumps({"status": status, "response": payload}))
+    return int(payload["upstream"]["value"])
+
+try:
+    with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=parallelism) as pool:
+        for value in pool.map(fetch_one, range(requests)):
+            values.append(value)
+
+    status_resp, session = post_json("/session/status", {}, token=token)
+    logout_status, logout = post_json("/session/logout", {}, token=token)
+    invalid_status, invalid = post_json("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+except Exception as exc:
+    try:
+        post_json("/session/logout", {}, token=token)
+    finally:
+        raise SystemExit(str(exc))
+
+sorted_values = sorted(values)
+expected = list(range(sorted_values[0], sorted_values[-1] + 1)) if sorted_values else []
+
+summary = {
+    "ok": True,
+    "username": username,
+    "proxy_url": proxy_url,
+    "requests": requests,
+    "parallelism": parallelism,
+    "unique": len(set(values)) == len(values),
+    "gap_free": sorted_values == expected,
+    "min": min(sorted_values) if sorted_values else None,
+    "max": max(sorted_values) if sorted_values else None,
+    "values": sorted_values,
+    "login": login,
+    "session_status": {"status": status_resp, "response": session},
+    "logout": {"status": logout_status, "response": logout},
+    "post_logout": {"status": invalid_status, "response": invalid},
+}
+print(json.dumps(summary, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+if not summary["unique"] or not summary["gap_free"] or logout_status != 200 or invalid_status != 401:
+    raise SystemExit(1)
+PY
--- a/phase65_concurrency_probe.py
+++ b/phase65_concurrency_probe.py
@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Phase 6.5 concurrency probe for the direct browser-to-k_proxy path.
+
+What it does:
+- Creates a small batch of enrolled users.
+- Logs each user in through k_proxy over TLS.
+- Fires protected counter requests in parallel using the returned bearer tokens.
+- Verifies that all calls succeed and that returned counter values are unique and contiguous.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import ssl
+import sys
+import time
+from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any
+from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
+from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Session:
+    username: str
+    token: str
+
+
+def request_json(
+    base_url: str,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    method: str = "GET",
+    payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    token: str | None = None,
+    cafile: str | None = None,
+    timeout: int = 10,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
+    req = Request(f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}", method=method)
+    req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+    if token:
+        req.add_header("Authorization", f"Bearer {token}")
+    data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+    context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=cafile) if base_url.startswith("https://") else None
+    try:
+        with urlopen(req, data=data, timeout=timeout, context=context) as resp:
+            return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except HTTPError as exc:
+        try:
+            return exc.code, json.loads(exc.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except Exception:
+            return exc.code, {"ok": False, "error": f"http error {exc.code}"}
+    except URLError as exc:
+        return 502, {"ok": False, "error": f"url error: {exc.reason}"}
+    except Exception as exc:
+        return 502, {"ok": False, "error": f"request failed: {exc}"}
+
+
+def enroll_user(base_url: str, cafile: str, username: str, display_name: str) -> None:
+    status, data = request_json(
+        base_url,
+        "/enroll/register",
+        method="POST",
+        payload={"username": username, "display_name": display_name},
+        cafile=cafile,
+    )
+    if status == 200:
+        return
+    if status == 409 and data.get("error") == "user already enrolled":
+        return
+    raise RuntimeError(f"enroll failed for {username}: status={status} data={data}")
+
+
+def login_user(base_url: str, cafile: str, username: str) -> Session:
+    status, data = request_json(
+        base_url,
+        "/session/login",
+        method="POST",
+        payload={"username": username},
+        cafile=cafile,
+    )
+    if status != 200 or not data.get("session_token"):
+        raise RuntimeError(f"login failed for {username}: status={status} data={data}")
+    return Session(username=username, token=data["session_token"])
+
+
+def counter_call(base_url: str, cafile: str, session: Session, call_id: int) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    started = time.time()
+    status, data = request_json(
+        base_url,
+        "/resource/counter",
+        method="POST",
+        payload={},
+        token=session.token,
+        cafile=cafile,
+    )
+    finished = time.time()
+    return {
+        "call_id": call_id,
+        "username": session.username,
+        "status": status,
+        "data": data,
+        "latency_ms": int((finished - started) * 1000),
+    }
+
+
+def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Run Phase 6.5 concurrency probe against k_proxy")
+    parser.add_argument("--base-url", default="https://127.0.0.1:9771")
+    parser.add_argument("--ca-file", required=True)
+    parser.add_argument("--users", type=int, default=3)
+    parser.add_argument("--requests-per-user", type=int, default=4)
+    parser.add_argument("--username-prefix", default="phase65")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--max-workers",
+        type=int,
+        help="Maximum number of in-flight protected calls; defaults to total requests",
+    )
+    return parser.parse_args()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    args = parse_args()
+
+    sessions: list[Session] = []
+    for idx in range(args.users):
+        username = f"{args.username_prefix}_{idx}"
+        enroll_user(args.base_url, args.ca_file, username, f"Phase65 User {idx}")
+        sessions.append(login_user(args.base_url, args.ca_file, username))
+
+    jobs: list[tuple[Session, int]] = []
+    call_id = 0
+    for session in sessions:
+        for _ in range(args.requests_per_user):
+            jobs.append((session, call_id))
+            call_id += 1
+
+    results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    max_workers = args.max_workers or len(jobs)
+    with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers) as executor:
+        future_map = {
+            executor.submit(counter_call, args.base_url, args.ca_file, session, job_id): (session.username, job_id)
+            for session, job_id in jobs
+        }
+        for future in as_completed(future_map):
+            username, job_id = future_map[future]
+            try:
+                results.append(future.result())
+            except Exception as exc:
+                results.append(
+                    {
+                        "call_id": job_id,
+                        "username": username,
+                        "status": 599,
+                        "data": {"ok": False, "error": str(exc)},
+                        "latency_ms": -1,
+                    }
+                )
+
+    results.sort(key=lambda item: item["call_id"])
+    ok_results = [item for item in results if item["status"] == 200 and item["data"].get("ok")]
+    values = [item["data"]["upstream"]["value"] for item in ok_results]
+    values_sorted = sorted(values)
+    contiguous = bool(values_sorted) and values_sorted == list(range(values_sorted[0], values_sorted[0] + len(values_sorted)))
+
+    summary = {
+        "ok": len(ok_results) == len(results) and len(set(values)) == len(values) and contiguous,
+        "users": args.users,
+        "requests_per_user": args.requests_per_user,
+        "total_requests": len(results),
+        "max_workers": max_workers,
+        "successful_requests": len(ok_results),
+        "unique_counter_values": len(set(values)),
+        "counter_min": min(values_sorted) if values_sorted else None,
+        "counter_max": max(values_sorted) if values_sorted else None,
+        "counter_contiguous": contiguous,
+        "max_latency_ms": max((item["latency_ms"] for item in results), default=None),
+        "results": results,
+    }
+    print(json.dumps(summary, indent=2))
+    return 0 if summary["ok"] else 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/playwright.config.js
+++ b/playwright.config.js
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// Minimal local Playwright config for the k_client browser flow.
+const { defineConfig } = require("@playwright/test");
+
+module.exports = defineConfig({
+  testDir: "./tests",
+  timeout: 180_000,
+  expect: {
+    timeout: 15_000,
+  },
+  use: {
+    baseURL: process.env.PORTAL_BASE_URL || "http://127.0.0.1:8766",
+    headless: process.env.PW_HEADLESS === "1",
+    trace: "on-first-retry",
+    screenshot: "only-on-failure",
+    video: "retain-on-failure",
+  },
+  reporter: [["list"]],
+});
--- a/raw_ctap_probe.py
+++ b/raw_ctap_probe.py
@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Low-level CTAP2 probe for ChromeCard host debugging.
+
+This bypasses the higher-level Fido2Client/WebAuthn helpers so we can inspect
+raw makeCredential/getAssertion behavior, keepalive callbacks, and transport
+errors on the host stack.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import secrets
+import sys
+import time
+import traceback
+from typing import Any
+
+try:
+    from fido2.ctap import CtapError
+    from fido2.ctap2 import Ctap2
+    from fido2.hid import CtapHidDevice
+    from fido2.hid.linux import get_descriptor, open_connection
+except Exception as exc:
+    print("Missing dependency: python-fido2", file=sys.stderr)
+    print("Install with: python3 -m pip install fido2", file=sys.stderr)
+    print(f"Import error: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+    sys.exit(2)
+
+
+def _json_default(value: Any) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, bytes):
+        return value.hex()
+    if isinstance(value, set):
+        return sorted(value)
+    if hasattr(value, "items"):
+        return dict(value.items())
+    return str(value)
+
+
+def _now() -> str:
+    return time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", time.localtime())
+
+
+def log(message: str) -> None:
+    print(f"[{_now()}] {message}", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
+
+
+def list_devices() -> list[CtapHidDevice]:
+    return list(CtapHidDevice.list_devices())
+
+
+def describe_device(dev: CtapHidDevice) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    desc = getattr(dev, "descriptor", None)
+    return {
+        "product_name": getattr(desc, "product_name", None),
+        "manufacturer": getattr(desc, "manufacturer_string", None),
+        "vendor_id": getattr(desc, "vid", None),
+        "product_id": getattr(desc, "pid", None),
+        "path": getattr(desc, "path", None),
+    }
+
+
+def get_ctap2(dev: CtapHidDevice) -> Ctap2:
+    return Ctap2(dev)
+
+
+def get_device(index: int, device_path: str | None) -> CtapHidDevice:
+    if device_path:
+        descriptor = get_descriptor(device_path)
+        return CtapHidDevice(descriptor, open_connection(descriptor))
+    devs = list_devices()
+    if not devs:
+        raise SystemExit("No CTAP HID devices found.")
+    if index < 0 or index >= len(devs):
+        raise SystemExit(f"Invalid --index {index}; found {len(devs)} device(s).")
+    return devs[index]
+
+
+def print_json(payload: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+    print(json.dumps(payload, indent=2, default=_json_default))
+
+
+def keepalive_logger(status: int) -> None:
+    log(f"keepalive status={status}")
+
+
+def _coerce_hex_bytes(value: str | None, label: str) -> bytes | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    raw = value.strip().lower()
+    if raw.startswith("0x"):
+        raw = raw[2:]
+    try:
+        return bytes.fromhex(raw)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise SystemExit(f"invalid hex for {label}: {value}") from exc
+
+
+def _client_data_hash(label: str) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.sha256(label.encode("utf-8")).digest()
+
+
+def _key_params() -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    return [
+        {"type": "public-key", "alg": -7},
+        {"type": "public-key", "alg": -257},
+    ]
+
+
+def do_info(ctap2: Ctap2, device_meta: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+    info = ctap2.get_info()
+    print_json({"device": device_meta, "ctap2_info": info})
+    return 0
+
+
+def do_make_credential(ctap2: Ctap2, args: argparse.Namespace, device_meta: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+    rp = {"id": args.rp_id, "name": args.rp_name or args.rp_id}
+    user_id = args.user_id.encode("utf-8")
+    user = {
+        "id": user_id,
+        "name": args.user_name,
+        "displayName": args.user_display_name or args.user_name,
+    }
+    client_data_hash = _client_data_hash(f"chromecard-make-credential:{args.rp_id}:{args.user_name}")
+    options = {"rk": args.resident_key, "uv": args.user_verification}
+    log(
+        "starting makeCredential "
+        f"rp_id={args.rp_id} user={args.user_name} rk={options['rk']} uv={options['uv']}"
+    )
+    try:
+        response = ctap2.make_credential(
+            client_data_hash=client_data_hash,
+            rp=rp,
+            user=user,
+            key_params=_key_params(),
+            options=options,
+            on_keepalive=keepalive_logger,
+        )
+    except CtapError as exc:
+        print_json(
+            {
+                "operation": "makeCredential",
+                "device": device_meta,
+                "rp": rp,
+                "user": user,
+                "options": options,
+                "error_type": "CtapError",
+                "error_code": getattr(exc, "code", None),
+                "error_name": str(getattr(exc, "code", None)),
+                "message": str(exc),
+            }
+        )
+        return 1
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print_json(
+            {
+                "operation": "makeCredential",
+                "device": device_meta,
+                "rp": rp,
+                "user": user,
+                "options": options,
+                "error_type": type(exc).__name__,
+                "message": str(exc),
+                "traceback": traceback.format_exc(),
+            }
+        )
+        return 1
+
+    auth_data = getattr(response, "auth_data", None)
+    credential_data = getattr(auth_data, "credential_data", None)
+    print_json(
+        {
+            "operation": "makeCredential",
+            "device": device_meta,
+            "rp": rp,
+            "user": user,
+            "options": options,
+            "fmt": getattr(response, "fmt", None),
+            "auth_data": auth_data,
+            "credential_id_hex": getattr(credential_data, "credential_id", b"").hex()
+            if credential_data is not None
+            else None,
+            "credential_data_hex": bytes(credential_data).hex() if credential_data is not None else None,
+            "att_stmt": getattr(response, "att_stmt", None),
+        }
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def do_get_assertion(ctap2: Ctap2, args: argparse.Namespace, device_meta: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
+    allow_credential = _coerce_hex_bytes(args.allow_credential_id, "allow-credential-id")
+    allow_list = [{"type": "public-key", "id": allow_credential}] if allow_credential else None
+    client_data_hash = _client_data_hash(f"chromecard-get-assertion:{args.rp_id}")
+    options = {"up": True, "uv": args.user_verification}
+    log(
+        "starting getAssertion "
+        f"rp_id={args.rp_id} allow_list={1 if allow_list else 0} uv={options['uv']}"
+    )
+    try:
+        response = ctap2.get_assertion(
+            rp_id=args.rp_id,
+            client_data_hash=client_data_hash,
+            allow_list=allow_list,
+            options=options,
+            on_keepalive=keepalive_logger,
+        )
+    except CtapError as exc:
+        print_json(
+            {
+                "operation": "getAssertion",
+                "device": device_meta,
+                "rp_id": args.rp_id,
+                "allow_list": allow_list,
+                "options": options,
+                "error_type": "CtapError",
+                "error_code": getattr(exc, "code", None),
+                "error_name": str(getattr(exc, "code", None)),
+                "message": str(exc),
+            }
+        )
+        return 1
+    except Exception as exc:
+        print_json(
+            {
+                "operation": "getAssertion",
+                "device": device_meta,
+                "rp_id": args.rp_id,
+                "allow_list": allow_list,
+                "options": options,
+                "error_type": type(exc).__name__,
+                "message": str(exc),
+                "traceback": traceback.format_exc(),
+            }
+        )
+        return 1
+
+    assertions: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for item in getattr(response, "assertions", []) or []:
+        assertions.append(
+            {
+                "credential": getattr(item, "credential", None),
+                "auth_data": getattr(item, "auth_data", None),
+                "signature": getattr(item, "signature", None),
+                "user": getattr(item, "user", None),
+                "number_of_credentials": getattr(item, "number_of_credentials", None),
+            }
+        )
+    print_json(
+        {
+            "operation": "getAssertion",
+            "device": device_meta,
+            "rp_id": args.rp_id,
+            "allow_list": allow_list,
+            "options": options,
+            "assertions": assertions,
+        }
+    )
+    return 0
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Low-level CTAP2 host probe")
+    parser.add_argument("--index", type=int, default=0, help="Device index from --list output")
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--device-path",
+        help="Use a specific hidraw node such as /dev/hidraw0 instead of scanning all devices",
+    )
+    subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+
+    subparsers.add_parser("list", help="List CTAP HID devices")
+    subparsers.add_parser("info", help="Fetch CTAP2 getInfo")
+
+    make_credential = subparsers.add_parser("make-credential", help="Run raw CTAP2 makeCredential")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--rp-id", default="localhost")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--rp-name", default="ChromeCard Local Probe")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--user-name", default="probe-user")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--user-display-name", default="Probe User")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--user-id", default=secrets.token_hex(16))
+    make_credential.add_argument("--resident-key", action="store_true")
+    make_credential.add_argument("--user-verification", action="store_true")
+
+    get_assertion = subparsers.add_parser("get-assertion", help="Run raw CTAP2 getAssertion")
+    get_assertion.add_argument("--rp-id", default="localhost")
+    get_assertion.add_argument("--allow-credential-id", help="Credential id as hex")
+    get_assertion.add_argument("--user-verification", action="store_true")
+
+    return parser
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = build_parser()
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    if args.command == "list":
+        devs = list_devices()
+        print_json(
+            {
+                "devices": [describe_device(dev) for dev in devs],
+            }
+        )
+        return 0 if devs else 1
+
+    dev = get_device(args.index, args.device_path)
+    device_meta = describe_device(dev)
+    ctap2 = get_ctap2(dev)
+
+    if args.command == "info":
+        return do_info(ctap2, device_meta)
+    if args.command == "make-credential":
+        return do_make_credential(ctap2, args, device_meta)
+    if args.command == "get-assertion":
+        return do_get_assertion(ctap2, args, device_meta)
+    parser.error(f"unsupported command: {args.command}")
+    return 2
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
--- a/tests/k_client_portal.spec.js
+++ b/tests/k_client_portal.spec.js
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+const { test, expect } = require("@playwright/test");
+
+const registrationTimeoutMs = Number(process.env.CARD_REGISTRATION_TIMEOUT_MS || "90000");
+const loginTimeoutMs = Number(process.env.CARD_LOGIN_TIMEOUT_MS || "90000");
+
+function uniqueUsername() {
+  return `pw_${Date.now().toString(36)}`;
+}
+
+async function waitForActionResult(page, action, expectedText, timeoutMs) {
+  const flowResult = page.locator("#flowResult");
+  await action();
+  await expect(flowResult).toContainText(expectedText, { timeout: timeoutMs });
+}
+
+test.describe("k_client portal regression", () => {
+  test("registers, logs in, reads counter, logs out, and unregisters", async ({ page }) => {
+    const username = uniqueUsername();
+    const usersList = page.locator("#usersList");
+    const flowResult = page.locator("#flowResult");
+    const sessionLine = page.locator("#stateSession");
+
+    test.setTimeout(registrationTimeoutMs + loginTimeoutMs + 90_000);
+
+    await page.goto("/");
+    await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: "ChromeCard Client Flow" })).toBeVisible();
+    await page.getByLabel("Username").fill(username);
+
+    await test.step("Register user", async () => {
+      // Card step: press yes on the registration prompt.
+      await waitForActionResult(
+        page,
+        () => page.getByRole("button", { name: "Register User" }).click(),
+        "User registration succeeded.",
+        registrationTimeoutMs
+      );
+      await expect(usersList).toContainText(username);
+    });
+
+    await test.step("Login", async () => {
+      // Card step: press yes on the authentication prompt.
+      await waitForActionResult(
+        page,
+        () => page.getByRole("button", { name: "Login" }).click(),
+        "Login succeeded. You can now call k_server.",
+        loginTimeoutMs
+      );
+      await expect(sessionLine).toContainText("Session active: yes");
+    });
+
+    await test.step("Call k_server counter", async () => {
+      await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Call k_server" }).click();
+      await expect(flowResult).toContainText("k_server was reached. Counter value:");
+    });
+
+    await test.step("Logout", async () => {
+      await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Logout" }).click();
+      await expect(flowResult).toContainText("Session cleared.");
+      await expect(sessionLine).toContainText("Session active: no");
+    });
+
+    await test.step("Unregister user", async () => {
+      const row = usersList.locator(".user-row", { hasText: username });
+      await expect(row).toBeVisible();
+      await row.getByRole("button", { name: "Unregister" }).click();
+      await expect(flowResult).toContainText(`User ${username} was unregistered.`);
+      await expect(usersList).not.toContainText(username);
+    });
+  });
+});
--- a/tests/test_k_proxy.py
+++ b/tests/test_k_proxy.py
@ -0,0 +1,804 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Unit tests for k_proxy_app.py.
+
+Card (FIDO2/CTAP) and k_server (UpstreamPool) are mocked throughout.
+All tests run locally without any Qubes VMs or attached hardware.
+"""
+
+import http.client
+import json
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import time
+import unittest
+from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent.parent))
+
+import k_proxy_app as app
+from k_proxy_app import (
+    AUTH_MODE_FIDO2_DIRECT,
+    AUTH_MODE_PROBE,
+    Enrollment,
+    Handler,
+    ProxyState,
+    UpstreamPool,
+    b64u_decode,
+    b64u_encode,
+    enrollment_payload,
+    normalize_display_name,
+    normalize_username,
+)
+
+
+# ── test helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _make_state(tmp_path, *, auth_mode=AUTH_MODE_PROBE, session_ttl=300):
+    return ProxyState(
+        session_ttl_s=session_ttl,
+        auth_mode=auth_mode,
+        auth_command="echo ok",
+        server_base_url="http://127.0.0.1:19999",
+        server_ca_file=None,
+        server_max_connections=1,
+        proxy_token="test-token",
+        enrollment_db=tmp_path / "enrollments.json",
+        rp_id="localhost",
+        rp_name="Test RP",
+        origin="https://localhost",
+        direct_device_path="",
+    )
+
+
+def _enrollment(username="alice", display_name=None, *, credential_data_b64=None):
+    now = int(time.time())
+    return Enrollment(
+        username=username,
+        display_name=display_name,
+        created_at=now,
+        updated_at=now,
+        credential_data_b64=credential_data_b64,
+    )
+
+
+# ── pure function tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestNormalizeUsername(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_simple_valid(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_username("alice"), "alice")
+
+    def test_strips_and_lowercases(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_username("  Alice  "), "alice")
+
+    def test_valid_with_dots_dashes_underscores(self):
+        for name in ("alice.smith", "alice-smith", "alice_smith", "a1b"):
+            with self.subTest(name=name):
+                self.assertEqual(normalize_username(name), name)
+
+    def test_too_short_raises(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            normalize_username("ab")
+
+    def test_too_long_raises(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            normalize_username("a" * 33)
+
+    def test_invalid_chars_raise(self):
+        for bad in ("Alice!", "al ice", "al@ice", "AB"):
+            with self.subTest(bad=bad):
+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+                    normalize_username(bad)
+
+    def test_minimum_length_valid(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_username("abc"), "abc")
+
+    def test_maximum_length_valid(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_username("a" * 32), "a" * 32)
+
+
+class TestNormalizeDisplayName(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_none_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(normalize_display_name(None))
+
+    def test_whitespace_only_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(normalize_display_name("   "))
+
+    def test_strips_whitespace(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_display_name("  Alice Smith  "), "Alice Smith")
+
+    def test_max_length_accepted(self):
+        self.assertEqual(normalize_display_name("a" * 64), "a" * 64)
+
+    def test_over_max_length_raises(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            normalize_display_name("a" * 65)
+
+
+class TestBase64Utils(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_round_trip(self):
+        original = b"\x00\x01\x02\xffsome\xffbinary"
+        self.assertEqual(b64u_decode(b64u_encode(original)), original)
+
+    def test_no_padding_chars_in_output(self):
+        encoded = b64u_encode(b"x")
+        self.assertNotIn("=", encoded)
+
+    def test_decode_handles_missing_padding(self):
+        encoded = b64u_encode(b"hello")
+        self.assertEqual(b64u_decode(encoded), b"hello")
+
+
+class TestEnrollmentPayload(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_basic_fields(self):
+        e = _enrollment("alice", "Alice Smith")
+        payload = enrollment_payload(e)
+        self.assertTrue(payload["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(payload["username"], "alice")
+        self.assertEqual(payload["display_name"], "Alice Smith")
+        self.assertFalse(payload["has_credential"])
+
+    def test_has_credential_true_when_data_present(self):
+        e = _enrollment(credential_data_b64="abc")
+        self.assertTrue(enrollment_payload(e)["has_credential"])
+
+    def test_created_flag_included_when_given(self):
+        e = _enrollment()
+        self.assertIn("created", enrollment_payload(e, created=True))
+        self.assertNotIn("created", enrollment_payload(e))
+
+
+# ── session management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestSessionManagement(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmpdir.cleanup()
+
+    def test_create_returns_token_and_future_expiry(self):
+        token, expires_at = self.state.create_session("alice")
+        self.assertIsInstance(token, str)
+        self.assertGreater(len(token), 16)
+        self.assertGreater(expires_at, time.time())
+
+    def test_get_session_returns_correct_username(self):
+        token, _ = self.state.create_session("alice")
+        session = self.state.get_session(token)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(session)
+        self.assertEqual(session.username, "alice")
+
+    def test_get_session_unknown_token_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_session("not-a-real-token"))
+
+    def test_expired_session_returns_none(self):
+        state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name), session_ttl=-1)
+        token, _ = state.create_session("alice")
+        self.assertIsNone(state.get_session(token))
+
+    def test_invalidate_session_removes_it(self):
+        token, _ = self.state.create_session("alice")
+        self.assertTrue(self.state.invalidate_session(token))
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_session(token))
+
+    def test_invalidate_unknown_token_returns_false(self):
+        self.assertFalse(self.state.invalidate_session("ghost"))
+
+    def test_active_session_count_tracks_correctly(self):
+        self.assertEqual(self.state.active_session_count(), 0)
+        t1, _ = self.state.create_session("alice")
+        t2, _ = self.state.create_session("bob")
+        self.assertEqual(self.state.active_session_count(), 2)
+        self.state.invalidate_session(t1)
+        self.assertEqual(self.state.active_session_count(), 1)
+
+    def test_expired_sessions_garbage_collected(self):
+        state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name), session_ttl=-1)
+        state.create_session("alice")
+        state.create_session("bob")
+        self.assertEqual(state.active_session_count(), 0)
+
+    def test_tokens_are_unique(self):
+        tokens = {self.state.create_session("alice")[0] for _ in range(20)}
+        self.assertEqual(len(tokens), 20)
+
+    def test_uses_direct_fido2_false_in_probe_mode(self):
+        self.assertFalse(self.state.uses_direct_fido2())
+
+    def test_uses_direct_fido2_true_in_direct_mode(self):
+        state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name), auth_mode=AUTH_MODE_FIDO2_DIRECT)
+        self.assertTrue(state.uses_direct_fido2())
+
+    def test_auth_mode_label_probe(self):
+        self.assertEqual(self.state.auth_mode_label(), "card_presence_probe")
+
+    def test_auth_mode_label_direct(self):
+        state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name), auth_mode=AUTH_MODE_FIDO2_DIRECT)
+        self.assertEqual(state.auth_mode_label(), "fido2_assertion")
+
+
+# ── enrollment management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestEnrollmentManagement(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp_path = Path(self._tmpdir.name)
+        self.state = _make_state(self.tmp_path)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmpdir.cleanup()
+
+    def test_register_creates_enrollment(self):
+        e = self.state.register_enrollment("alice", "Alice Smith")
+        self.assertEqual(e.username, "alice")
+        self.assertEqual(e.display_name, "Alice Smith")
+        self.assertTrue(self.state.has_enrollment("alice"))
+
+    def test_register_persists_across_state_reload(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        state2 = _make_state(self.tmp_path)
+        self.assertTrue(state2.has_enrollment("alice"))
+
+    def test_register_duplicate_raises_file_exists_error(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        with self.assertRaises(FileExistsError):
+            self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+
+    def test_register_invalid_username_raises_value_error(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            self.state.register_enrollment("A!", None)
+
+    def test_register_display_name_too_long_raises(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            self.state.register_enrollment("alice", "x" * 65)
+
+    def test_update_changes_display_name(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", "Old")
+        updated = self.state.update_enrollment("alice", "New")
+        self.assertEqual(updated.display_name, "New")
+        self.assertEqual(self.state.get_enrollment("alice").display_name, "New")
+
+    def test_update_unknown_user_raises_key_error(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(KeyError):
+            self.state.update_enrollment("nobody", "Name")
+
+    def test_delete_removes_enrollment(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        self.state.delete_enrollment("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(self.state.has_enrollment("alice"))
+
+    def test_delete_invalidates_active_sessions(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        token, _ = self.state.create_session("alice")
+        self.state.delete_enrollment("alice")
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_session(token))
+
+    def test_delete_does_not_affect_other_users_sessions(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        self.state.register_enrollment("bob", None)
+        bob_token, _ = self.state.create_session("bob")
+        self.state.delete_enrollment("alice")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self.state.get_session(bob_token))
+
+    def test_delete_unknown_user_raises_key_error(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(KeyError):
+            self.state.delete_enrollment("nobody")
+
+    def test_list_enrollments_sorted_alphabetically(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("charlie", None)
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        self.state.register_enrollment("bob", None)
+        names = [e.username for e in self.state.list_enrollments()]
+        self.assertEqual(names, ["alice", "bob", "charlie"])
+
+    def test_get_enrollment_found(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", "Alice")
+        e = self.state.get_enrollment("alice")
+        self.assertIsNotNone(e)
+        self.assertEqual(e.username, "alice")
+
+    def test_get_enrollment_not_found_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_enrollment("nobody"))
+
+    def test_get_enrollment_invalid_username_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_enrollment("!bad!"))
+
+    def test_has_enrollment_true(self):
+        self.state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        self.assertTrue(self.state.has_enrollment("alice"))
+
+    def test_has_enrollment_false(self):
+        self.assertFalse(self.state.has_enrollment("nobody"))
+
+    def test_register_direct_mode_delegates_to_direct_method(self):
+        state = _make_state(self.tmp_path, auth_mode=AUTH_MODE_FIDO2_DIRECT)
+        fake = _enrollment("alice", credential_data_b64="cred")
+        with patch.object(state, "_register_direct_fido2", return_value=fake) as mock_direct:
+            result = state.register_enrollment("alice", None)
+        mock_direct.assert_called_once_with("alice", None)
+        self.assertEqual(result.username, "alice")
+
+
+# ── authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestProbeAuth(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name))
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmpdir.cleanup()
+
+    def _mock_proc(self, returncode, stdout="", stderr=""):
+        proc = MagicMock()
+        proc.returncode = returncode
+        proc.stdout = stdout
+        proc.stderr = stderr
+        return proc
+
+    def test_success_when_subprocess_returns_zero(self):
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.subprocess.run", return_value=self._mock_proc(0, '{"ok": true}')):
+            ok, _ = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+
+    def test_failure_when_subprocess_returns_nonzero(self):
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.subprocess.run", return_value=self._mock_proc(1, stderr="No CTAP HID devices")):
+            ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertIn("No CTAP HID devices", msg)
+
+    def test_failure_uses_stdout_when_stderr_empty(self):
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.subprocess.run", return_value=self._mock_proc(2, stdout="probe failed")):
+            ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertIn("probe failed", msg)
+
+    def test_failure_when_subprocess_raises(self):
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.subprocess.run", side_effect=TimeoutError("timed out")):
+            ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertIn("auth command failed", msg)
+
+
+class TestDirectFido2Auth(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.state = _make_state(Path(self._tmpdir.name), auth_mode=AUTH_MODE_FIDO2_DIRECT)
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._tmpdir.cleanup()
+
+    def test_unenrolled_user_returns_false(self):
+        ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("nobody")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(msg, "user not enrolled")
+
+    def test_enrolled_without_credential_returns_false(self):
+        self.state.enrollments["alice"] = _enrollment("alice")
+        ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(msg, "user has no registered credential")
+
+    def test_exception_from_ctap_returns_false_with_message(self):
+        self.state.enrollments["alice"] = _enrollment("alice", credential_data_b64="dW5pY29kZQ")
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.AttestedCredentialData", side_effect=Exception("bad cbor")):
+            ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+        self.assertFalse(ok)
+        self.assertIn("assertion verification failed", msg)
+
+    def test_success_path_with_mocked_internals(self):
+        self.state.enrollments["alice"] = _enrollment("alice", credential_data_b64=b64u_encode(b"fake_cred"))
+
+        mock_cred = MagicMock()
+        mock_options = MagicMock()
+        mock_options.public_key.rp_id = "localhost"
+        mock_options.public_key.allow_credentials = []
+        mock_options.public_key.challenge = b"challenge"
+        mock_client_data = MagicMock()
+        mock_client_data.hash = b"hash"
+        mock_assertion = MagicMock()
+        mock_assertion.assertions = None
+        mock_assertion.credential = {"id": b"cred_id"}
+        mock_assertion.auth_data = b"auth"
+        mock_assertion.signature = b"sig"
+        mock_assertion.user = None
+
+        with patch("k_proxy_app.AttestedCredentialData", return_value=mock_cred), \
+             patch("k_proxy_app.AuthenticationResponse", return_value=MagicMock()), \
+             patch("k_proxy_app.AuthenticatorAssertionResponse", return_value=MagicMock()), \
+             patch.object(self.state, "_drop_direct_device"), \
+             patch.object(self.state.fido_server, "authenticate_begin", return_value=(mock_options, {})), \
+             patch.object(self.state, "_collect_client_data", return_value=mock_client_data), \
+             patch.object(self.state, "_with_direct_ctap2", return_value=mock_assertion), \
+             patch.object(self.state.fido_server, "authenticate_complete"):
+            ok, msg = self.state.authenticate_with_card("alice")
+
+        self.assertTrue(ok)
+        self.assertEqual(msg, "assertion verified")
+
+
+# ── upstream pool ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class TestUpstreamPool(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _pool(self):
+        return UpstreamPool(
+            server_base_url="http://127.0.0.1:19999",
+            server_ca_file=None,
+            max_connections=2,
+        )
+
+    def _mock_response(self, status, body, will_close=True):
+        resp = MagicMock()
+        resp.status = status
+        resp.read.return_value = body
+        resp.will_close = will_close
+        return resp
+
+    def test_successful_request_returns_status_and_parsed_json(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.getresponse.return_value = self._mock_response(200, b'{"ok": true, "value": 7}')
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn):
+            status, data = pool.request_json("/resource/counter", {"X-Proxy-Token": "tok"}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["value"], 7)
+
+    def test_non_200_status_is_returned_as_is(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.getresponse.return_value = self._mock_response(403, b'{"ok": false, "error": "forbidden"}')
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn):
+            status, data = pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 403)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+
+    def test_oserror_returns_502(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.request.side_effect = OSError("connection refused")
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn):
+            status, data = pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 502)
+        self.assertIn("server unavailable", data["error"])
+
+    def test_empty_body_returns_empty_dict(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.getresponse.return_value = self._mock_response(200, b"")
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn):
+            status, data = pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(data, {})
+
+    def test_connection_reused_when_will_close_false(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.getresponse.return_value = self._mock_response(200, b'{"ok": true}', will_close=False)
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn) as mock_new:
+            pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+            pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(mock_new.call_count, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(conn.request.call_count, 2)
+
+    def test_connection_not_reused_when_will_close_true(self):
+        pool = self._pool()
+        conn = MagicMock()
+        conn.getresponse.return_value = self._mock_response(200, b'{"ok": true}', will_close=True)
+        with patch.object(pool, "_new_connection", return_value=conn) as mock_new:
+            pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+            pool.request_json("/test", {}, {})
+        self.assertEqual(mock_new.call_count, 2)
+
+
+# ── HTTP handler integration tests ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class ServerFixture(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Spins up a real ThreadingHTTPServer backed by a ProxyState with mocked
+    card and upstream. Card auth and fetch_counter are patched per-test via
+    patch.object(self.state, ...) or the _login() helper."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp_path = Path(self._tmpdir.name)
+        self.state = _make_state(self.tmp_path)
+        Handler.state = self.state
+        self.server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
+        self.port = self.server.server_address[1]
+        self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self.server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
+        self._thread.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.server.shutdown()
+        self.server.server_close()
+        self._tmpdir.cleanup()
+
+    # ── request helpers ──
+
+    def _conn(self):
+        return http.client.HTTPConnection("127.0.0.1", self.port, timeout=5)
+
+    def _get(self, path):
+        conn = self._conn()
+        try:
+            conn.request("GET", path)
+            resp = conn.getresponse()
+            return resp.status, resp.read()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+    def _get_json(self, path):
+        status, body = self._get(path)
+        return status, json.loads(body)
+
+    def _post(self, path, payload=None, token=None):
+        conn = self._conn()
+        try:
+            body = json.dumps(payload or {}).encode()
+            headers = {
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Content-Length": str(len(body)),
+            }
+            if token:
+                headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
+            conn.request("POST", path, body=body, headers=headers)
+            resp = conn.getresponse()
+            return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+    def _post_raw(self, path, raw_body):
+        conn = self._conn()
+        try:
+            headers = {
+                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                "Content-Length": str(len(raw_body)),
+            }
+            conn.request("POST", path, body=raw_body, headers=headers)
+            resp = conn.getresponse()
+            return resp.status, resp.read()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+    # ── state helpers ──
+
+    def _enroll(self, username="alice", display_name=None):
+        self.state.register_enrollment(username, display_name)
+
+    def _login(self, username="alice"):
+        """Enroll user and obtain a session token with the card mocked to succeed."""
+        self._enroll(username)
+        with patch.object(self.state, "authenticate_with_card", return_value=(True, "ok")):
+            status, data = self._post("/session/login", {"username": username})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200, f"login setup failed: {data}")
+        return data["session_token"]
+
+
+class TestHandlerHealth(ServerFixture):
+    def test_get_root_returns_html(self):
+        status, body = self._get("/")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertIn(b"ChromeCard", body)
+
+    def test_health_returns_service_info(self):
+        status, data = self._get_json("/health")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["service"], "k_proxy")
+        self.assertIn("active_sessions", data)
+
+    def test_health_reflects_active_session_count(self):
+        self.state.create_session("alice")
+        _, data = self._get_json("/health")
+        self.assertEqual(data["active_sessions"], 1)
+
+    def test_unknown_get_returns_404(self):
+        status, _ = self._get("/nonexistent")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 404)
+
+    def test_unknown_post_returns_404(self):
+        status, _ = self._post_raw("/nonexistent", b"{}")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 404)
+
+
+class TestHandlerEnrollment(ServerFixture):
+    def test_register_new_user_returns_200(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/enroll/register", {"username": "alice", "display_name": "Alice"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["username"], "alice")
+        self.assertEqual(data["display_name"], "Alice")
+
+    def test_register_duplicate_returns_409(self):
+        self._enroll("alice")
+        status, data = self._post("/enroll/register", {"username": "alice"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 409)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+
+    def test_register_invalid_username_returns_400(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/enroll/register", {"username": "A!"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 400)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+
+    def test_register_invalid_json_returns_400(self):
+        status, _ = self._post_raw("/enroll/register", b"not-json")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 400)
+
+    def test_enroll_status_found(self):
+        self._enroll("alice", "Alice Smith")
+        status, data = self._get_json("/enroll/status?username=alice")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["display_name"], "Alice Smith")
+
+    def test_enroll_status_not_found_returns_404(self):
+        status, data = self._get_json("/enroll/status?username=nobody")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 404)
+
+    def test_enroll_status_missing_param_returns_400(self):
+        status, data = self._get_json("/enroll/status")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 400)
+
+    def test_enroll_list_empty(self):
+        status, data = self._get_json("/enroll/list")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertEqual(data["users"], [])
+
+    def test_enroll_list_returns_sorted_users(self):
+        self._enroll("charlie")
+        self._enroll("alice")
+        _, data = self._get_json("/enroll/list")
+        names = [u["username"] for u in data["users"]]
+        self.assertEqual(names, ["alice", "charlie"])
+
+    def test_enroll_update_changes_display_name(self):
+        self._enroll("alice", "Old")
+        status, data = self._post("/enroll/update", {"username": "alice", "display_name": "New"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertEqual(data["display_name"], "New")
+
+    def test_enroll_update_unknown_returns_404(self):
+        status, _ = self._post("/enroll/update", {"username": "nobody"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 404)
+
+    def test_enroll_delete_returns_200_and_deleted_true(self):
+        self._enroll("alice")
+        status, data = self._post("/enroll/delete", {"username": "alice"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["deleted"])
+        self.assertFalse(self.state.has_enrollment("alice"))
+
+    def test_enroll_delete_unknown_returns_404(self):
+        status, _ = self._post("/enroll/delete", {"username": "nobody"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 404)
+
+
+class TestHandlerSession(ServerFixture):
+    def test_login_success_returns_token(self):
+        self._enroll("alice")
+        with patch.object(self.state, "authenticate_with_card", return_value=(True, "ok")):
+            status, data = self._post("/session/login", {"username": "alice"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertIn("session_token", data)
+        self.assertIn("expires_at", data)
+        self.assertEqual(data["auth_mode"], "card_presence_probe")
+
+    def test_login_unenrolled_user_returns_403(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/login", {"username": "nobody"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 403)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+        self.assertIn("not enrolled", data["error"])
+
+    def test_login_card_failure_returns_401(self):
+        self._enroll("alice")
+        with patch.object(self.state, "authenticate_with_card", return_value=(False, "No CTAP devices")):
+            status, data = self._post("/session/login", {"username": "alice"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+        self.assertIn("card auth failed", data["error"])
+        self.assertIn("No CTAP devices", data["details"])
+
+    def test_login_invalid_username_returns_400(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/login", {"username": "!bad!"})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 400)
+
+    def test_session_status_valid_token(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        status, data = self._post("/session/status", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["username"], "alice")
+        self.assertIn("expires_at", data)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(data["seconds_remaining"], 0)
+
+    def test_session_status_no_token_returns_401(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/status", {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+
+    def test_session_status_invalid_token_returns_401(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/status", {}, token="bad-token")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+        self.assertIn("invalid or expired", data["error"])
+
+    def test_logout_valid_token(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        status, data = self._post("/session/logout", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertTrue(data["invalidated"])
+        self.assertIsNone(self.state.get_session(token))
+
+    def test_logout_invalid_token_returns_200_not_invalidated(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/logout", {}, token="ghost")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertFalse(data["invalidated"])
+
+    def test_logout_no_token_returns_401(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/session/logout", {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+
+    def test_session_invalid_after_logout(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        self._post("/session/logout", {}, token=token)
+        status, data = self._post("/session/status", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+
+    def test_multiple_sessions_independent(self):
+        t1 = self._login("alice")
+        t2 = self._login("bob")
+        # logout alice, bob's session still valid
+        self._post("/session/logout", {}, token=t1)
+        status, data = self._post("/session/status", {}, token=t2)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertEqual(data["username"], "bob")
+
+
+class TestHandlerResource(ServerFixture):
+    def test_counter_with_valid_session(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        with patch.object(self.state, "fetch_counter", return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "value": 5})):
+            status, data = self._post("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+        self.assertTrue(data["ok"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["upstream"]["value"], 5)
+        self.assertEqual(data["username"], "alice")
+        self.assertTrue(data["session_reused"])
+
+    def test_counter_no_token_returns_401(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/resource/counter", {})
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+
+    def test_counter_invalid_token_returns_401(self):
+        status, data = self._post("/resource/counter", {}, token="garbage")
+        self.assertEqual(status, 401)
+
+    def test_counter_upstream_failure_propagated(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        with patch.object(self.state, "fetch_counter", return_value=(502, {"ok": False, "error": "server unavailable"})):
+            status, data = self._post("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 502)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+        self.assertIn("upstream failed", data["error"])
+
+    def test_counter_returns_upstream_non_200_as_error(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        with patch.object(self.state, "fetch_counter", return_value=(403, {"ok": False, "error": "forbidden"})):
+            status, data = self._post("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 403)
+        self.assertFalse(data["ok"])
+
+    def test_counter_session_still_valid_after_call(self):
+        token = self._login()
+        with patch.object(self.state, "fetch_counter", return_value=(200, {"ok": True, "value": 1})):
+            self._post("/resource/counter", {}, token=token)
+        status, _ = self._post("/session/status", {}, token=token)
+        self.assertEqual(status, 200)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main(verbosity=2)
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Morten V. Christiansen	23c37f4590	Merge docs-maintenance: Phase 6 complete, project in holding pattern Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 13:18:01 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	9d6da53b8f	Update Workplan current status: phases 6.5/7/9 all externally gated Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 13:17:58 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	855b4175bc	Update Setup.md and Workplan.md for 2026-04-27 session - fido2-direct confirmed as deployed default after full browser flow with real card - Document enroll-clears-session bug fix - Document k_proxy unit test suite (100 tests) - Record current deployed service state and port map Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 11:29:26 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	2cf44e97df	Refactor all three service files and fix enroll-clears-session bug - Update module docstrings to concise service descriptions - Add _require_json() helper to Handler in k_proxy and k_client_portal, eliminating repetitive try/except JSON-parse blocks in handler methods - Cache SSL context once in ClientState.__init__ instead of per-request - Fix: ClientState.enroll() now calls /session/logout on k_proxy before re-enrolling, so the old server-side session is invalidated rather than left to expire (discovered via live test where re-register after login caused subsequent logout to fail with missing bearer token) - Add targeted comments explaining non-obvious invariants: _gc_locked lock ownership, _with_direct_ctap2 retry-on-reopen, _require_session None convention, will_close connection reuse, HTTP/1.1 body-drain requirement, 90 s interactive timeout margin, and enroll session-clearing rationale Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 11:27:57 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	e7212b49a0	Add k_proxy unit tests with mocked card and upstream 100 tests covering session management, enrollment CRUD, probe and direct FIDO2 auth routing, UpstreamPool connection handling, and all HTTP endpoints via a live in-process server. Card (FIDO2/CTAP) and k_server are fully mocked so the suite runs locally without hardware or VMs. Also hardens the fido2.features.webauthn_json_mapping import guard to tolerate older python-fido2 versions that lack the attribute. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-27 10:44:43 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	86189793b7	inconsistancies resolved	2026-04-26 07:14:19 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	bd839ea42d	Add Playwright portal regression and harden direct auth	2026-04-25 21:06:08 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	e57f8a446f	Improve portal enrollment controls and direct hidraw selection	2026-04-25 19:29:28 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	1d85c21d7f	Add k_client browser flow demo	2026-04-25 15:56:50 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	689587629a	Harden direct auth path and regression helper	2026-04-25 15:49:52 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	2448956946	Add CTAP probe and update phase docs	2026-04-25 10:25:40 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	d0d27a0896	Move browser portal to k_proxy	2026-04-25 01:47:26 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	4893eb8312	Add Phase 6 client portal and enrollment flow	2026-04-25 01:42:03 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	46fb878f8d	Document Phase 2.5 ownership and concurrency	2026-04-25 01:33:16 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	4b0b126bf9	Add Phase 2 HTTPS prototype and runbook updates	2026-04-25 01:29:37 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	6db7a7e217	Update Qubes chain status docs	2026-04-25 01:12:47 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	37600548ac	Start Phase 5 proxy/server session reuse prototype	2026-04-24 10:30:40 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	3dcac21dd0	Record successful WebAuthn register/login in k_proxy	2026-04-24 06:48:52 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	b6dbbc4839	Record AppVM startup success after memory tuning	2026-04-24 06:08:43 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	4f58b83842	Log Qubes libxenlight VM start blocker	2026-04-24 06:02:47 +02:00
Morten V. Christiansen	8888601f69	Record AppVM template and UI baseline	2026-04-24 05:52:44 +02:00